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1 Introduction
While some features of the unemployment insurance (UI) system vary across countries (for instance,
the level and time profile of unemployment benefits), the different UI systems share one striking
similarity: the participation to UI is universally mandated and no coverage choice is offered to
workers. Workers are forced to pay payroll taxes when employed and receive a set transfer when
unemployed, which is not subject to choice. Neither do private markets exist for more compre-
hensive UI. Why do (almost) all countries mandate UI? Why is no coverage choice available? Are
these optimal features of UI design? Despite the large existing literature on UI, these fundamental
questions have so far been unanswered.
A universal mandate is seen as the canonical solution to the inefficiencies arising under adverse
selection [see Akerlof [1970], Chetty and Finkelstein [2013]]. Indeed, it is well-known that adverse
selection hinders efficient market function as low risks leave the market and put upward pressure on
equilibrium prices. Adverse selection is arguably the culprit here, but there are two issues with this
argument in the context of UI. First, since UI is universally mandated, the role of adverse selection
in UI has never been tested before. Second, even when adverse selection is present, the government
may do better by using alternative interventions that allow for choice (e.g., subsidies, minimum
mandates with choice of supplemental coverage, etc.), which are common practice in all other
social insurance programs (health insurance, old-age pensions, etc.). Our paper tries to address
both issues. We provide first-time evidence on the presence and severity of risk-based selection
into unemployment insurance and we develop a general framework to evaluate the desirability of a
universal mandate relative to choice-based interventions using this evidence.
Our empirical analysis exploits the combination of an exceptional setting and rich, administra-
tive data in Sweden. All Swedish workers are entitled to a minimum benefit level when becoming
unemployed, but can opt to buy more comprehensive UI at a uniform premium set by the govern-
ment.1 The comprehensive plan has been heavily subsidized - the premium corresponds to only
25% of the difference between the average cost of providing the comprehensive plan and the average
cost of providing the basic plan. This subsidy has encouraged more than 80% of workers to buy
the comprehensive plan. We observe the UI choice of the universe of Swedish workers and can link
these choices to their unemployment histories registered by the Public Employment Service. We
merge this data with a rich collection of household and firm registers, providing extremely detailed
information on the determinants of workers’ unemployment risk and insurance choices.
We present a set of empirical results, which provide direct and robust evidence that work-
ers have private information about their unemployment risk, and act on this when making their
unemployment insurance choice. This would create severe adverse selection in any UI market.
In a first step, following a prominent literature studying insurance markets, we perform so-
called positive correlation tests, assessing whether workers who choose to buy comprehensive UI
1Denmark, Iceland and Finland also run a voluntary UI program, historically administered by trade union-linked
funds (the so-called Ghent system). This is the system many countries had in place before switching to compulsory
insurance overseen by the government [see Carroll [2005]].
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are more likely to be unemployed (see Chiappori and Salanie´ [2000]). Our estimates indicate that
the unemployment risk for workers buying the comprehensive coverage is about 2.3 times the risk
for workers who choose to stay on basic coverage. Interestingly, this large difference is robust
to various measures of unemployment risk, but also to the introduction of a rich set of controls.
Hence, even when absorbing the variation in risk coming from observables, workers’ choices remain
strongly correlated with unemployment risk, suggesting strong asymmetries in information that
cannot be priced. In fact, some controls increase the positive correlation estimate, suggesting that
these observables drive advantageous selection into insurance. For example, young workers are
more likely to be unemployed, but also less likely to buy comprehensive coverage. In contrast,
controlling for unemployment histories does substantially reduce the correlation between current
UI choices and future unemployment.
In a second step, we go beyond the positive correlation tests, as the correlations may still be fully
driven by moral hazard. We use risk and price variation to provide direct evidence of risk-based
selection and estimate empirical moments relevant for welfare analysis:
First, we explain how and under what assumptions risk shifters, that affect individuals’ un-
employment probability conditional on their own actions, can be used to test for the presence of
risk-based selection. This test is similar in spirit to the unused observables test in Finkelstein and
Poterba [2014], and can reject that marginal costs curves are flat and unrelated to willingness to
pay in both plans. We implement this test by exploiting various features of the Swedish labor
market that provide variation in unemployment risk beyond the direct control of individuals. In
particular, we focus on firm layoff risk and relative tenure ranking - two key determinants of an
individual’s unemployment risk due to the strict enforcement of the last-in-first-out principle in
Sweden. First, we find that workers who switch firms increase their UI coverage and more so the
higher the layoff risk in the new compared to the old firm. Second, we find that workers who are
employed by a firm issuing a collective layoff notification, indicative of a shock to layoff risk at the
firm level, increase their UI coverage and more so the lower their relative tenure ranking. The large
responses confirm the importance of risk-based selection into UI.
Second, we provide additional evidence of risk-based selection following the approach proposed
by Einav et al. [2010b], which consists in using price variation to identify marginal buyers and
compare their unemployment risk to infra-marginal buyers of the same insurance plan. Price
or policy variation allows estimating how the cost of providing either insurance plan changes,
and therefore identifies the risk-based selection, given unpriced heterogeneity, that is relevant for
assessing the welfare impact of changing these prices or policies. We exploit a large premium
increase (following the first-time election of the right-wing party in Sweden) and provide evidence
of significant risk based selection. In particular, we find that the marginal workers who stopped
buying comprehensive coverage when the price increased face an unemployment risk that is 30%
to 40% higher than inframarginal workers who did not buy comprehensive coverage, neither before
nor after the premium increase, when all these workers are observed under the same basic coverage.
We show that unpriced observables have a limited role in explaining the magnitude of risk-based
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selection revealed by the price variation approach. The 2007 price reform also allows to investigate
patterns of selection along other dimensions than unemployment probability. In particular, we use
proxies for risk aversion and for the expected value of having unemployment insurance to reveal
the presence of significant selection based on risk-preferences.
Our results provide evidence of significant risk-based selection in the Swedish UI system. Yet,
a worry may be that observable risks are not priced in the current Swedish UI policy, and that
severe risk-based selection could be easily avoided by conditioning the policy on more observables.
The comprehensiveness and granularity of our data allows us to go beyond the specificities of the
Swedish system and provide compelling evidence that even if a very rich set of observables were
priced, severe adverse selection would remain in the UI market.
Despite the severe adverse selection, our estimates indicate that it is not efficient to mandate
all Swedish workers to buy comprehensive coverage. Using a revealed preference approach, we can
use prices to bound the value of supplemental coverage depending on whether a worker chooses to
buy it or not. For workers who choose not to buy the supplemental coverage, its value is exceeded
by our estimates of the average cost of providing the supplemental coverage to this group. Hence,
we have identified workers for whom the welfare surplus from buying the comprehensive coverage
is negative. Mandating them to buy the comprehensive coverage would decrease welfare. This is of
course an important conclusion in light of the universal mandates of as comprehensive UI coverage
in other countries, the desirability of which has never been tested before.2
We also use our empirical analysis to study the welfare implications of choice-based policy
interventions under adverse selection. We build on the seminal work by Einav and Finkelstein
[Einav et al. [2010b]], extending their framework to be able to analyze the desirability of both price
a´nd coverage interventions. We provide simple sufficient-statistic formulae that highlight the key
trade-offs and allow linking our empirical estimates to the theory. A key result that we leverage
in deriving these formulae is that the welfare impact of changes in insurance selection is fully
captured by the corresponding fiscal externality, which simplifies to the price and cost differential of
providing coverage to the marginal workers. The central trade-off when subsidizing comprehensive
coverage is between reducing adverse selection into comprehensive insurance - captured by the
corresponding fiscal externality - and redistributing to the workers buying comprehensive coverage.
A minimum mandate is a complementary policy, as it mitigates the welfare loss from being priced
out of comprehensive insurance, but worsens the adverse selection in the supplemental market.
The central trade-off when setting the level of the minimum mandate is thus not just between
providing insurance and maintaining incentives for those on the basic plan, as it also creates an
adverse selection externality by attracting “good” risks away from the comprehensive plan.
Applying our formulae to the Swedish context, we find that the large subsidy for supplemental
insurance, covering 75 percent of the difference in average cost of providing the comprehensive vs.
basic coverage, is about optimal. The simple reason is that this subsidy is almost equal to the
2Examples of countries mandating UI with similar replacement rates as the voluntary, comprehensive plan in
Sweden are Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. In other countries like the
US and the UK, UI is also compulsory, but at lower replacement rates.
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large wedge between average and marginal costs driven by adverse selection. This also implies that
for assessing the minimum mandate, the large subsidy basically neutralizes the externality from
worsening the adverse selection when increasing the UI benefit level of the minimum mandate.
Hence, the minimum mandate can be evaluated using the standard Baily-Chetty formula [Baily
[1978], Chetty [2006]], accounting for the fact that workers who opt to stay with the minimum
mandate value insurance less, but are under lower coverage as well.
Our work contributes to different strands of literature. First, a large literature has analyzed the
role of adverse selection in insurance markets. While the theoretical work dates back to the classical
references by Akerlof [1970] and Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976], the surge in empirical work has
been recent, pioneered by Chiappori and Salanie´ [2000] in the context of car insurance and rapidly
extended to various insurance markets and settings [see Einav et al. [2010a]]. Our work highlights
the advantages of using comprehensive, detailed and population-wide registry data to perform
correlation tests, but also proposes new approaches to isolate exogenous risk variation and identify
risk-based selection. Second, the lack of private markets and choices related to unemployment
insurance, makes that the role of adverse selection in UI has been untested so far. Most related
to our paper is the work by Hendren [2017], who analyzes elicited beliefs about job loss and
finds that workers’ private information on their unemployment risk is sufficient to explain the
absence of a private market for supplemental unemployment insurance in the US (in addition to the
public UI policy in place). Our paper complements Hendren’s evidence with direct evidence based
on actual insurance choices and studies the optimality of the public unemployment policy itself.
Finally, there is a large literature studying the optimal trade-off between insurance and incentives in
determining UI coverage [Baily [1978], Chetty [2006], Schmieder et al. [2012], Kolsrud et al. [2017]],
which never considered potential selection effects when allowing for choice. On the other hand, a
growing literature starting with the work by Einav and Finkelstein analyzes adverse selection and
its welfare consequences, allowing for equilibrium pricing, but taking insurance coverage as given
(e.g., Hackmann et al. [2015], Finkelstein et al. [2017]). Our framework tries to bridge these two
strands of the literature, allowing not only to evaluate price subsidies, but also the coverage levels
themselves. We are also providing applicable insights related to recent work by Veiga and Weyl
[2016] and Azevedo and Gottlieb [2017] who characterize equilibria with both endogenous prices
and coverages.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the insitutional background and the
data we use. In Section 3 we provide the results of our correlation tests relating unemployment
risk to unemployment coverage. In Sections 4 and 5 we go beyond the correlation test using risk
and price variation to provide direct evidence for risk-based selection. In Section 6 we provide a
theoretical framework to analyze the welfare impact of different policy implementations, which we
then link to our empirical estimates in the Swedish context. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Context and Data
2.1 Institutional Background
Unemployment Insurance Sweden is with Iceland, Denmark and Finland, one of the only four
countries in the world to have a voluntary UI scheme derived from the “Ghent system”. In practice,
the Swedish UI system consists of two parts.
The first part of the system is mandated and provides basic coverage funded by a payroll tax
(that we denote p0). The benefits that unemployed receive with this basic coverage (b0) are non-
contributory (i.e., do not depend on the unemployed earnings prior to displacement). The benefit
level of the basic coverage is low. During our period of analysis (2002-2009) the benefit level
remained at 320 SEK per day (≈35 USD) which corresponds to a replacement rate of a little less
than 20% for the median wage earner.3
The second part of the Swedish UI system is voluntary. By paying an insurance premium p
to UI funds (on top of the payroll tax), workers can opt for more comprehensive coverage.4 Upon
displacement, workers who have continuously contributed premia for the comprehensive coverage
during the past twelve months, get benefits b1, that replace 80% of previous earnings up to a cap,
in lieu of the basic coverage b0. Workers are free to opt in or out of the comprehensive UI plan
at any time. Apart from the level of benefits, there are no coverage differences between the basic
and the comprehensive UI scheme. In particular, the potential duration of benefits b0 and b1 is the
same, and was unlimited during our period of analysis. Moreover, to be eligible for either benefit
upon unemployment, workers must fulfil a labor market attachment criterion, which is that they
need to have worked 80 hours per month for six months during the past year.
The administration of the comprehensive UI coverage is done by 27 UI funds (Kassa’s) but
the government, through the Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF), supervises and co-
ordinates the entire UI system. In particular, both the premia and benefit levels of the basic and
comprehensive coverage are fully determined by the government. Importantly, the government
does not allow UI funds to charge different prices to different individuals. One exception are union
members who get a small rebate of ≈ 10% on the UI premium for the comprehensive coverage.5
During our period of study, the government also did not allow premia to differ across UI funds.
Premia paid by workers cover only a (small) fraction of benefits paid by the UI funds to eligible
unemployed, and the government subsidizes UI funds for the difference out of the general budget.
Until January 1st of 2007, the monthly premium p for the comprehensive coverage was ho-
mogenous across UI funds, at around 100 SEK, and a 40% income tax credit was given for the
premia paid. In January 2007, the newly elected right-wing government increased the premium
substantially and removed the income tax credit on premia paid to UI funds. It also introduced an
3Benefits are paid per “working day”, which means that there are 5 days of benefits paid per week. Benefits of
320 SEK a day therefore translate into 6960 SEK a month (≈765 USD).
4We denote the price of the comprehensive coverage as p1 = p+ p0.
5Note that individuals can still continue to contribute to UI funds while unemployed, to build eligibility in case
of a future unemployment spell, in which case they are also entitled to paying a reduced premium.
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additional fee that partly tied the premium of each UI fund to the average unemployment rate of
that fund, starting from July 2008. In our analysis, and partly due to data availability, we focus
on the period before July 2008 where insurance premia are homogenous across UI funds.
Historically, with the “Ghent system” in place, labor and trade unions played an important role
in providing unemployment insurance in Sweden. Today’s 27 UI funds, which broadly correspond
to 27 different industries/occupations, originated from unemployment insurance funds set up by
unions. However, since the government overtook the responsibility of supervising the entire UI
system in 1948, the links between UI funds and unions have loosened progressively.6 In our empirical
analysis, we always control for trade union membership to account for the fact that union members
face a different UI premium than non-members.
Layoff Notifications and Last-In-First-Out Principle In our analysis, we exploit variation
in unemployment risk across individuals within a firm. Under Sweden’s employment-protection
law, firms subject to a shock and intending to displace 5 or more workers simultaneously must
notify the Public Employment Service in advance. Once a notification is emitted, employers need
to come up with the list and dates for the intended layoffs. These layoffs may happen up to 2 years
after the original notification has been sent. The list needs to follow the last-in-first-out principle.
This means that workers get divided into groups, defined by collective bargaining agreements, and
then a tenure ranking within each group is constructed.7 The more recent hires are displaced before
workers with longer tenure. For firms with multiple establishments, one layoff notification needs to
be sent for each establishment intending to layoff workers. And the LIFO principle applies at the
level of the establishment.
2.2 Data
We combine data from various administrative registers in Sweden. First, we use UI fund member-
ship information for the universe of workers in Sweden aged 18 and above, from 2002 to 2009, and
coming from two distinct sources. The first source is tax data for the period 2002 to 2006, during
which workers paying UI premia received a 40% tax credit. This source records the total amount
of UI premia paid for each year. From this source, we define a dummy variable V for buying the
comprehensive coverage in year t as reporting any positive amount of premia paid in year t. We use
this source of information for the positive correlation tests of Section 3, as well as the risk variation
analysis in Section 4.2. For the analysis using the price variation of the 2007 reform in Section 5.2,
we combine this data with a second source of information, coming from UI fund data that Kassa’s
sent to the IAF. This data contains a dummy variable indicating whether an individual aged 18
and above in Sweden is contributing premia for the comprehensive coverage as of December of each
6The 10% rebate on UI premia for union members is a remnant of the “Ghent system”, but a large (≈ 20%) and
growing share of workers are members of an unemployment fund without being members of a union, and a growing
share of union members (≈ 10%) do not buy unemployment insurance.
7In our data, the collective bargaining agreement that individuals are in is not directly observed. We use detailed
occupation codes instead, which are regarded as a good proxy.
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year from 2005 until 2009.
We add data on unemployment outcomes coming from the Swedish Public Employment Service,
with records for the universe of unemployment spells from 1990 to 2015, and we merge it with the
UI benefit registers from the IAF which provides information on all UI benefit payments (for
both the basic and comprehensive coverage), information on daily wage for benefit computation,
and Kassa membership information for all unemployed individuals. Based on this data, we define
unemployment as a spell of non-employment, following an involuntary job loss, and during which an
individual has zero earnings, receives unemployment benefits and reports searching for a full-time
job. To define the start date of an unemployment spell, we use the registration date at the PES. The
end of a spell is defined as finding any employment (part-time or full-time employment, entering a
PES program with subsidized work or training, etc.) or leaving the PES (labor force exit, exit to
another social insurance program such as disability insurance, etc.).8 We define displacement as an
involuntary job loss, due to a layoff or a quit following a ‘valid reason’.9 In the rest of the paper,
we use the terms displacement and layoff as synonyms.
We complement this data with information on earnings, income, taxes and transfers and demo-
graphics from the LISA register, and with information on wealth from the wealth tax registers.
Finally, we use two labor market registers. The matched employer-employee register (RAMS),
from 1985 to 2015, reports monthly earnings for the universe of individuals employed in establish-
ments of firms operating in Sweden. We use this register to compute tenure and tenure ranking
for each employee. We also use the layoff-notification register (VARSEL) which records, for years
2002 to 2012, all layoff notifications emitted by firms.
In Table 1, we provide summary statistics for our main sample of interest over the period 2002
to 2006. To mitigate concerns about younger individuals switching in and out of education, or older
individuals close to retirement, we restrict our attention to individuals aged between 25 and 55. The
average probability to be displaced in year t+ 1 conditional on working in year t is 3.35%, (3.56%
when including quits) over the period 2002 to 2006. The average probability to be unemployed in
year t + 1 (unconditional on employment status in year t) is higher, at 4.71%. Note also that the
fraction of individuals who are members of a UI fund (i.e., buying the comprehensive UI coverage)
is large during the 2002-2006 period, at 86%.
3 Positive Correlation Tests
We first show the presence of a strong positive correlation between an individual’s choice of UI
coverage and his or her unemployment risk. This strong correlation is robust to different measures
8Note that UI benefits can be received forever in Sweden during the period 2002-2006 so the duration spent
unemployed is identical to the duration spent receiving unemployment benefits.
9Valid reasons for quitting a job are defined as being sick or injured from working, being bullied at work, or not
being paid out one’s wage by one’s employer. Quits are reviewed by the Public Employment Service at the moment
an individual registers a new spell and if the quit is made because of a valid reason, the individual is eligible for UI
and a notification is made in the PES data, allowing us to observe such quits under valid reasons. Involuntary quits
are a small fraction of unemployment spells in our sample: 95.0% of unemployment spells observed in our data are
due to layoffs. We exclude voluntary quits from our measure of unemployment and displacement.
8
of the unemployment risk, the addition of a rich set of controls and non-parametric implementa-
tions. Correlation tests are a natural first step to investigate adverse selection and common in the
insurance literature, but may be confounded by the presence of moral hazard.
3.1 Framework
We start by presenting the conceptual framework for insurance choices that underpins our empirical
and theoretical analysis. A Swedish worker faces the choice between two plans: a basic plan
(b0, p0) and a comprehensive plan (b1, p1) with unemployment benefit levels b1 > b0 and premia
p1 > p0. A workers chooses the plan providing the highest (indirect) expected utility. That is, a
worker buys the comprehensive plan (V = 1) when her expected utility in the comprehensive plan
exceeds her expected utility in the basic plan,
V = 1 if v − p ≥ 0,
V = 0 otherwise,
(1)
where v = v1−v0 and p = p1−p0.10 In a stylized binary risk setting, the net-value of a plan equals
vk − pk ≡ max
a′
pi
(
θ, a′
)
u
(
bk − pk|µ, a′
)
+
(
1− pi (θ, a′))u (w − pk|µ, a′) (2)
where pi denotes the probability of unemployment, a denotes effort, and θ and µ are risk and
preference parameters. Importantly, not only the value but also the cost of providing the coverage
depends on the agent’s type and her effort. In the binary-risk setting, the cost of providing plan k
equals ck = pi (θ, ak) bk, depending on the agent’s risk type θ and the effort level ak that she exerts
under contract k.
We refer to the group of individuals buying the comprehensive plan by I and those buying the
basic plan by U . Throughout the rest of the paper, we will use the notation EI(·) = E[·|v−p ≥ 0]
and EU (·) = E[·|v − p < 0] for the respective conditional expectations. The individuals at the
margin between the two plans are referred to by M .11 Regarding the timing of the model, we
stick closely to the structure of the Swedish UI system where individuals become eligible to receive
the supplemental benefits when they have been contributing for one year to the comprehensive
coverage, and can opt in and out of the comprehensive plan at any time. As a consequence, the
valuation vt of the comprehensive UI policy in year t depends on unemployment risk pit+1 in year
t + 1. With this in mind, we drop from now on the time subscripts with v always referring to vt
and pi to pit+1, unless otherwise specified.
10We focus on valuations that are quasi-linear in the premium pk as it leads conveniently to a welfare analysis in
terms of total surplus. This formulation, although it leaves out income effects, can still easily incorporate distributional
concerns through the social welfare function, as we do in Section 6.
11Marginal individuals are defined by the condition v = p. We further clarify this definition in the context of our
price variation experiment in Section 5.2.
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3.2 Correlation Tests
The insurance choice model of equation (2) suggests that v is an increasing function of pi and that
unpriced heterogeneity in θ leads to risk-based selection into UI. Unless preference heterogeneity
undoes this risk-based selection, adverse selection will arise whereby riskier individuals are more
likely to buy the comprehensive plan, creating a positive correlation between insurance choice and
observed risk. The correlation test consists in comparing the expected risk of individuals conditional
on their insurance coverage choice and testing for EI(pi) > EU (pi).
Linear Probability Model The simplest way to test for EI(pi) > EU (pi) in practice, is to
estimate a simple linear model for various measures Y of realized risk in year t + 1, which proxy
for pi:
Y = γ · V + X′α+ , (3)
where V is an indicator for buying the supplemental coverage in year t. The vector X controls
for individual characteristics that affect the unemployment insurance contracts available to each
individual. Controlling for these characteristics guarantees that we compare individuals who are
facing the same options so that the correlation is driven by demand rather than by supply (different
individuals being offered different contracts by the Kassa). As explained in Section 2 above, this
is strictly regulated by the government. We estimate model (3) over the period 2002-2006, during
which UI contracts only differ according to three dimensions: employment history, earnings and
union membership.
The first dimension is whether individuals meet the work eligibility requirement or not, for
which they need to have worked for at least 6 calendar months within the past 12 months prior to
displacement. We therefore include an indicator for having worked at least 6 months in year t in
X.12 The second dimension of contract differentiation is earnings: the additional daily benefits b
that individuals get when buying the supplemental coverage is a kinked function of daily earnings
w. Formally, b = b1− b0 = F (w) = (.8∗w−380) ·1[400 ≤ w < 725]+200 ·1[725 ≤ w].We therefore
include the supplemental benefit function F (w) as a control function in X to make sure that we
compare individuals facing the same benefit level per unit of premium paid.The last dimension
of contract differentiation is that union members pay a slightly lower premium than non-union
members for the supplemental coverage. We therefore include in X an indicator variable for union
membership. We also include year fixed effects in X to account for small adjustments to the
premium in January every year over the period 2002-2006.
Figure 1 reports the results of specification (3) for four different realized risk outcomes: total
UI claims under comprehensive coverage in t + 1, total duration spent unemployed in t + 1, the
12Note that eligibility requires individuals to have worked at least 80 hours per month for 6 calendar months within
the past 12 months. While we do not have precise data on monthly hours, to be conservative, we also include a
dummy for having earnings above 80 hours × 6 months × the negotiated janitor wage. In the absence of an official,
legally binding minimum wage in Sweden, the janitor wage is often considered the effective minimum wage in the
labor market.
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probability of displacement in t + 1, and the probability of displacement in t + 1 but excluding
involuntary quits. The total UI claims are defined as the total amount of UI benefits that individuals
would be collecting in t + 1 were they to buy the comprehensive coverage.13 For each outcome,
Figure 1 displays γˆ/Y¯ , that is the semi-elasticity of the realized risk outcome in t+ 1 with respect
to the insurance choice in t.
For all realized risk outcomes, we find a strong and significant positive correlation with UI
coverage choice. Individuals who buy the comprehensive coverage in t make UI claims in t+ 1 that
are 161.6% larger than the hypothetical claims under comprehensive coverage by individuals who
stick to the basic coverage in t. Their unemployment duration in t + 1 is 140.8% longer and they
are 131.7% more likely to be displaced in t+1 than individuals who do not buy it.
Alternative risk outcomes All risk outcomes capture ex-post risk realizations rather than ex-
ante risks. These realizations reflect in part actions taken by individuals because of their insurance
choices. The correlation test amounts to comparing EI(pi(a1)) to EU (pi(a0)) and estimated correla-
tions could therefore be driven by various sources of moral hazard. Separating risk-based selection
from moral hazard is exactly the topic of Sections 4 and 5. Still, simply comparing the magnitude
of the correlations across the different realized risk outcomes already sheds light on some margins
of moral hazard. A large body of literature has for instance documented that higher unemploy-
ment benefits increase the duration of unemployment spells conditional on becoming unemployed
(see Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016] for a recent review). Such moral hazard conditional on
displacement will increase the correlation between unemployment duration in t + 1 and insurance
coverage in t. The correlation between displacement probability in t+ 1 and insurance coverage in
t is immune to this particular source of moral hazard. The difference between the two estimates
(second vs third bar in Figure 1) captures the presence of moral hazard conditional on displace-
ment, although part of it might also be driven by selection on expected unemployment duration
conditional on displacement. The probability of displacement, while immune to moral hazard once
displaced, is potentially affected by moral hazard “on the job”. An example of this would be
collusion between employers and employees to qualify actual voluntary quits as “quits following a
valid reason”, which are eligible for unemployment benefits. The correlation of insurance coverage
with displacement probability and with displacement probability excluding “quits following a valid
reason” (third and fourth bar in Figure 1) is identical, suggesting that this collusion margin has
actually limited impact on the results of the positive correlation test.
Our correlation tests use the risk outcomes in t + 1, reflecting the idea that workers need to
contribute for a year to be able to get the comprehensive coverage. However, the risk realization in
t+ 1 may fail to fully capture the unemployment risk faced by an individual as she is making her
coverage choice at time t, which justifies using risk realizations further into the future. In Figure 2
we report the correlation of the insurance choice in t with displacement outcomes in t+ 1, t+ 2,...
up to t+ 8. For each displacement outcome, the chart displays γˆk/Y¯ , that is the semi-elasticity of
13For individuals who do not buy the comprehensive coverage in t, we therefore computed the counterfactual benefit
claims they would have if they were to receive supplemental benefits.
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the realized risk outcomes in t+k with respect to insurance choices in t, from a specification similar
to (3) where we also control for all displacement outcomes in previous years (t + k − 1, t + k − 2,
etc.). The Figure reveals an interesting dynamic pattern. The correlation decreases rapidly as
we consider later years, but remains statistically significant up to six years. This pattern could
indicate that workers’ insurance choices incorporate private information about unemployment risk
further into the future (albeit to a decreasing extent), but it may also be affected by moral hazard
responses.
Bivariate Probit & Non-parametric Tests While the linear probability model in (3) provides
a simple test for the presence of positive correlation between risk and insurance choices, and a
straightforward interpretation of its magnitude, it relies on a very limiting functional form and our
OLS estimates do not provide correct inference. We now relax these functional form restriction and
provide proper inference for the correlation tests. First, we provide results of bivariate probit tests,
popularized by Chiappori and Salanie´ [2000]. We specify both the choice of insurance coverage and
the realization of our binary measure of unemployment risk (i.e., the probability of displacement)
as probit models:
V = 1[X′α1 +  > 0]
Y = 1[X′α2 + η > 0]
(4)
allowing for correlation ρ between the two error terms  and η. The vector of controls X contains
the same variables as in specification (3). We provide in Table 2 estimates of ρ and formal tests of
the null that ρ = 0. Results confirm the presence of a strong and significant correlation between
insurance choices and realized unemployment risk. The functional forms involved in the bivariate
probit tests are still relatively restrictive since the latent models are linear and the errors are normal,
excluding cross-effects or more complicated non-linear functions of the variables in X. We therefore
also produce results from non-parametric tests as in Chiappori and Salanie´ [2000]. The procedure
of the test consists in partitioning the data into cells where all observations in a given cell have the
same value for the variables in X. The procedure then computes within each cell a Pearson’s χ2
test statistic for independence between V and Y . This test statistic is asymptotically distributed
as a χ2(1) under the null hypothesis that V and Y are statistically independent (within the cell).
We report in the first column of Table 3 results from this non-parametric procedure when cells
are defined using the same controls X as in specification (3) and where our risk measure Y is the
probability of displacement. Results again strongly confirm the presence of a positive correlation
between insurance choices and unemployment probability.14
14In Appendix Figure A.1, we display the empirical distribution of the Pearson’s χ2 test statistics computed from
all the cells allows for comparison with a theoretical χ2(1) distribution. Taking the largest absolute difference between
the theoretical and the empirical distribution gives the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic reported in Table 3.
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3.3 The Role of Unpriced Observables
As explained in Section 2, during our period of analysis, the Swedish unemployment system did not
allow for price discrimination across individuals based on differences in risks. Many observable char-
acteristics that are known to usually correlate with unemployment risk (age, industry, occupation,
gender, etc.) cannot be priced by insurance funds. We briefly explore to what extent the positive
correlation between insurance and unemployment risk documented above is directly driven by selec-
tion on such unpriced observables and whether the correlation would survive if such characteristics
were to be priced. To do so, we start with the baseline positive correlation test from specification
(3) where Y is the probability of displacement in t + 1, and show how the semi-elasticity γˆ/Y¯
evolves as we add more characteristics to the vector of controls X. Results are displayed in Figure
3 panel A. We start by adding (sequentially) demographic controls: age, then gender, and marital
status. Interestingly, the estimated correlation increases when adding these covariates, which sug-
gests that these characteristics actually drive the selection to be “advantageous”: they correlate
positively with risk but negatively with insurance coverage. Age in particular leads to meaningful
advantageous selection as young individuals are more likely to be unemployed, but significantly less
likely to buy UI. The correlation does not seem to be affected much by the inclusion of controls
for skills and other labor market characteristics. Adding rich sets of controls for education (four
categories), industry (1-digit code), occupation (1-digit code) and wealth level (quartiles) decreases
the estimated correlation only slightly. But adding controls for past unemployment history (dum-
mies for having been unemployed in t− 1, t− 2 and up to t− 8) has a significant negative effect on
the estimate. Past unemployment history is a strong predictor of future unemployment risk and
correlates strongly with current insurance choices. Yet, even when controlling very flexibly for past
unemployment history and all the other controls, results from Figure 3 show that a large positive
correlation remains between insurance choices and probability of displacement.
The results above could be affected by the potentially constraining linear functional form of our
specification (3), but are robust to more flexible functional forms and appropriate inference. First,
we show in Figure 3 panel B how the correlation from the bivariate probit specification (4) evolves
when adding sequentially to the vector X the same set of characteristics as in panel A. Second,
in Table 3, columns (2) to (4), we reproduce the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test adding
sequentially these same characteristics when partitioning the data into cells. Results confirm that
demographics, and age in particular, offer advantageous selection, that past unemployment history
creates significant adverse selection, and that a significant positive correlation between insurance
and probability of displacement remains even after controlling for all these rich observables.
4 Beyond Correlation Tests: Variation in Risks
The positive correlation tests are a useful starting point, but cannot separate risk-based selection
from moral hazard responses. In other words, it is well understood that correlation tests are a joint
test of selection and/or moral hazard. Identifying the respective role of selection and moral hazard
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is both useful from a descriptive perspective and necessary from a welfare perspective. This section
provides further evidence of substantial risk-based selection based on exploiting variation in risks.
4.1 Using Variation in Risk
Moral hazard creates reverse causality from insurance to risk, as individuals choose different levels
of optimal actions ak under each plan k = 0, 1. Such reverse causality could in principle fully drive
the correlation between observed realized risk Y and insurance. The most direct way to control
for moral hazard is to shift individuals’ risk, independently of individuals’ actions. To do this, one
needs to find variables Z that operate as unpriced shifters of individuals’ risks, akin to the unused
observables test in Finkelstein and Poterba [2014].
We briefly explain how and under what assumptions using such variation in risk can identify
the presence of risk-based selection. We start from the framework of equation (2) above, which can
be rewritten as:
v − p ≡ pi(θ, a1)∆u1(µ, a1)− pi(θ, a0)∆u0(µ, a0)−∆uw(µ, a1, a0) (5)
where ak denotes an individual’s optimal action under each plan k = 0, 1 and ∆uk(µ, ak) =
u (bk − pk|µ, ak) − u (w − pk|µ, ak) denotes the utility loss due to unemployment when covered by
plan k. We also use the notation ∆uw(µ, a1, a0) = u (w − p1|µ, a1)− u (w − p0|µ, a0).
Assume now that we can find risk shifters Z that have the following two properties: ∂pi(θ,Z,ak)∂Z 6= 0
and Z ⊥ µ. The first property is equivalent to a first-stage property and guarantees that Z shocks
individuals’ risk conditional on their actions. The second property can be thought of as an exclusion
restriction, and guarantees that Z is uncorrelated with the preference type µ, which would affect
willingness-to-pay independent of the change in risk. Under these two assumptions about Z, testing
for v − p ⊥ Z is a test for the null of no risk-based selection. In other words, rejecting the
null is equivalent to rejecting the “pure moral hazard” model, in which the correlation between
realized risk and insurance choice is entirely driven by moral hazard. The “pure moral hazard”
model is characterized by the fact that E(pi(θ, ak)|v) = γk for both plans k and thus that the
average unemployment risk is constant in v.15 The positive correlation test will pick up a positive
correlation in this model as long as γ1 6= γ0. Note, however, that there will be no correlation
between willingness-to-pay and any risk shifter Z satisfying the two properties above in the “pure
moral hazard” model. The reason is that if Z affects individuals’ risk, but is uncorrelated with
individuals’ preference type µ, it can only affect the insurance choice through its impact on risk.
Hence, a correlation between Z and insurance choices means that unemployment risk can no longer
be uncorrelated to the willingness-to-pay v as is the case in the “pure moral hazard” model.
If the exclusion restriction Z ⊥ µ were not to hold, the correlation between Z and preference
type µ could in principle exactly offset the direct impact of the risk shifter on the willingness-to-
15In the “pure moral hazard model”, there might still be heterogeneity in individuals’ risk types θ or in individ-
uals’ actions, but this heterogeneity must be offset by the preference heterogeneity such that the resulting risks are
uncorrelated with willingness-to-pay.
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pay and leave the resulting risk uncorrelated to the willingness-to-pay. In general, however, any
correlation between Z and willingness-to-pay would identify the presence of risk-based selection,
either stemming from the direct effect of Z on pi, which one could call “direct risk selection”, or
from selection on risk-related heterogeneity (including selection on moral hazard).16 In the rest of
this section, we exploit the presence of several unpriced risk shifters Z in the Swedish context, and
discuss for each of them whether Cov(Z, µ) = 0 is a credible assumption.
In practice, we test for correlation between risk shifters Z and willingness to pay by running
specifications like:
V = 1[σ · Z + X′α1 +  > 0] (6)
and testing for σ = 0. For useful comparison with the positive correlation test estimates in the
linear case, we also report comparison of the PCT model
V = βOLS · Y + X′α+  (7)
with estimates of the two-stage least square model
V = β2SLS · Y + X′α1 + 
Y = ζ · Z + X′α2 + η
(8)
The 2SLS model will yield βˆ2SLS = 0 if the OLS PCT estimate βˆOLS is fully driven by the pure
moral hazard model.17
4.2 Implementation
The implementation of the “risk-variation approach” relies on finding risk shifters that affect indi-
viduals’ risk probability conditional on their own actions, and that are credibly exogenous to pref-
erence heterogeneity (µ) governing individuals’ willingness-to-pay for insurance. Our risk shifters
exploit two fundamental sources of risk variation, arguably beyond the control of individuals.
The first source is firm level risk, which can vary cross-sectionally, due to permanent differences
in turnover across firms, or over time, due to firms experiencing temporary shocks. In Figure 4 panel
A, we provide evidence of the role of firm layoff risk as a shifter of individuals’ own displacement
probability. For each individual i working in firm j, we define average firm displacement risk pi−i,j
as the average probability of displacement of all other workers within the firm excluding individual
i over all years where the firm is observed active in our sample years. We then plot the average
firm displacement risk in 20 bins of equal population size, against the individual probability of
displacement in t+ 1. The Figure shows that there is significant heterogeneity in firms’ separation
16Selection on moral hazard is a form of risk-based selection, but where the choice to buy insurance is related to
the difference between e1 and e0. For example, an individual buys more coverage anticipating that he or she will
reduce her effort a lot under the extra coverage. This again again creates a correlation between willingness-to-pay
and cost of providing the different plans k.
17While risk-based selection is needed for βˆ2SLS 6= 0, the presence of moral hazard still affects this estimate when
individuals exert less effort in response to the extra coverage they buy when their risk is shifted.
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rates, and that individuals’ unemployment risk is very strongly correlated with firm level risk.
The second source of exogenous risk variation is at the individual level and stems from the
strict enforcement of the Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) principle. As explained in Section 2, when a
firm wants to downsize, the legal system prescribes that displacement occurs by descending order
of tenure within each establishment times occupation group. The tenure ranking of an individual
within her establishment and occupation group directly determines her probability to be separated.
Figure 4 panel B plots the probability of being displaced in t+1 among individuals working in firms
that emit a layoff notification in t+ 1, as a function of relative tenure ranking within establishment
and occupation. The Figure provides clear evidence of a strong negative correlation between relative
tenure ranking and individuals’ displacement probability. Individuals within the lowest 10 percent
of tenure rankings have a probability of being displaced in t + 1 larger than .1; this probability
declines steadily as tenure ranking increases, and then stays below .02 for individuals in the highest
50 percent tenure rankings.
We combine the sources of variations brought about by these underlying risk shifters (firm level
risk and LIFO) into three different identification strategies.
Firm Layoff Risk The first strategy consists in simply using the cross-sectional variation in
displacement risk across firms as a risk shifter. In Figure 5 panel A, we group individuals in
50 equal size bins of firm layoff risk, and plot their average firm layoff risk against their average
probability of buying supplemental coverage, residualized on the same vector X of baseline controls
affecting UI contracts used in the positive correlation test of Section 3.2. The graph displays a strong
positive correlation between firm layoff risk and individuals’ probability to buy the comprehensive
UI coverage, indicating that there is a clear correlation between Z and willingness to pay (σ 6= 0).
We also report on the graph the coefficient βOLS from an OLS regression of specification (7) and then
the estimated coefficient β2SLS from our two-stage least square model (8) where we use Z = pi−i,j
as a risk shifter. In panel B of Figure 5, we replicate the same procedure, but now add to the
regression the same rich set of additional controls used in Section 3.3, and find a similar strong
positive correlation between insurance choices and firm layoff risk.
The positive and significant coefficient β2SLS = .50 (.01) rejects that the results of the positive
correlation tests of Section 3.2 are solely driven by moral hazard. The relative magnitude of β2SLS
and βOLS is also informative. While we anticipate that by controlling for moral hazard β2SLS
decreases relative to βOLS , two effects can play in the opposite direction. First, the two-stage least
square procedure removes the potential attenuation bias from measurement error in βOLS . Second,
risk shifters also introduces some selection, through Cov(Z, µ), which has an a priori ambiguous
impact on the estimate. Cov(Z, µ) will depend on the self-selection of workers into riskier firms:
if workers who select to work in riskier firms are more likely to buy UI, selection will be positive.
Cov(Z, µ) will also depend on the unobserved effect of riskier firm environments on insurance
choices: firms with high turnover may have different prevalence of collective bargaining, different
firm cultures that can affect individuals’ UI choices. Decomposing µ = κi + ρj into an individual
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specific component κi and a firm specific component ρj , we can think of the the selection introduced
by a risk shifter Z as the combination of individual fixed effects and firm fixed effects. We now
move to two additional strategies that allow us to control more directly for these two sources of
selection introduced by our risk shifters.
Firm Switchers Design In this second strategy, we use the panel dimension of the data to
control for the selection introduced by individual specific heterogeneity κi. We exploit within
individual variation in risk, stemming from both risk shifters: firm risk and tenure ranking. To
this end, we focus on individuals who change firms (“switchers”). The employer-employee matched
data (RAMS ) registers all existing labor contracts on a monthly basis. We define a switch as
moving from having a labor contract with firm j (the origin firm) to having a contract with firm
k (the destination firm), without any recorded non-employment spell between these two contracts.
We focus on individuals with more than 1 year of tenure in the origin firm. Switchers experience
a change in their layoff risk coming from underlying variation in both risk shifters: their tenure
ranking changes, and so does their underlying firm layoff risk.
First, switchers experience a reduction in their relative tenure ranking, as they become the
“last-in” when they move to the destination firm. To document the magnitude of the variation in
relative tenure ranking and corresponding layoff risk, following a firm switch, we define year n = 0
as the year of a firm switch, and run, on the sample of firm switchers, event studies of the form:
Yn =
∑
k
δk · 1[n = k] + X′α+  (9)
where Yn denotes the risk outcome of interest in event year n, 1[n = k] are a set of event time
dummies, and X is the vector of baseline controls affecting UI contracts. In Appendix Figure
A.2, we display the evolution of relative tenure ranking of switchers as a function of event time by
plotting the coefficient δk, taking event time n = −1 as the omitted category. The graph confirms
that relative tenure ranking decreases sharply at the moment of the firm switch. Figure 6 panel A
explores how this variation in relative tenure ranking affects the probability of displacement over
event time n. The graph shows that the displacement rate one year ahead (in year t+ 1) increases
sharply and significantly at the time of the firm switch.
In Figure 7 panel A, we run a similar event study specification with UI coverage as an outcome.
The figure shows that the probability of buying the comprehensive coverage increases sharply by
about 2.2 percentage points at the time of the firm switch. On the graph, we also display the
coefficient from a two-stage least square specification similar to (8) where we use firm switch as
risk shifter Z for individual displacement probability and control for individual fixed-effects. β2SLS
is positive and strongly significant, which again indicates that the positive correlation tests are not
simply picking up moral hazard responses to insurance coverage.
While these event studies control for fixed underlying heterogeneity across individuals that may
affect their UI choices (κi), one concern with this original implementation of the firm switchers
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design is that individuals are somewhat inert, and decide to reoptimize their UI choices only at
specific times, like, for instance, when they switch firm.
To mitigate the concern that the surge in UI coverage at the time of the switch is the result of
the specific timing of UI choices and not a response to the change in underlying risk, we exploit
additional variation in risk in the switchers design coming from changes in underlying firm layoff
risk. While all switchers experience an increase in their displacement probability due to the decline
in their tenure ranking, the effect of a switch on individual displacement probability exhibits large
differences according to whether their destination firm is much riskier (“positive shock”) or a lot
less risky (“negative shock”) than their origin firm. We therefore split the population of switchers
according to their rank in the distribution of ∆j,j′pi−i = pi−i,j′−pi−i,j , the change in their underlying
firm risk when moving from firm j to firm j′. In Figure 6 panel B, we contrast individuals in the
bottom decile of ∆j,j′pi−i (large negative shock, i.e., individuals who experience a large negative
decline in their firm layoff risk, going from a high risk to a low risk firm), and individuals in the
top decile of ∆j,j′pi−i (large positive shock, i.e., individuals who experience a large increase in their
firm layoff risk going from a low risk to a high risk firm). The Figure confirms that individuals
experiencing a large positive shock in their firm layoff risk exhibit a significantly larger increase,
of about 2 percentage point, in their displacement probability at the time of the switch, relative
to individuals experiencing a large negative shock. In panel B of Figure 7, we now compare the
evolution of insurance choices around firm switch for individuals experiencing large positive vs
large negative shocks. The graph indicates that the increase in the probability to buy UI around
firm switch is significantly larger (by about 1.5 percentage point) among individuals moving to
significantly more risky firms relative to those moving to less risky firms. We also report on
the graph the estimated coefficient β2SLS = .57 (.08) of the two-stage model of specification (8)
where we now use firm switch interacted with ∆pi−i,j as risk shifter Z for individual displacement
probability.
Layoff Notification and LIFO The previous strategy may still pick up selection on firm level
heterogeneity ρj if firm heterogeneity is correlated with ∆pi−i,j . The final strategy controls jointly
for firm level heterogeneity ρj and individual level heterogeneity κi by exploiting variation in layoff
risk both within firm and across individuals over time. To this effect we leverage the fact that
under Sweden’s employment-protection law, firms subject to a shock and intending to displace
5 or more workers simultaneously must notify the Public Employment Service in advance. In
Figure 8 we report the evolution of the displacement probability of workers around the first layoff
notification event in the history of the firm. We define event year n = 0 as the year in which
a firm emits its first layoff notification, and focus on the panel of workers who are employed in
the firm at the date this layoff notification is emitted to the PES. The graph shows that a layoff
notification is indeed associated with a sudden and large increase in the displacement probability
of workers. Immediately following the layoff notification, the displacement rate of workers jumps
by 6 percentage points compared to pre-notification levels, and remains high for about two years,
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before decreasing and converging back to pre-notification levels.
Because the panel of workers is selected based on being employed in the firm in year n = 0, one
may worry that this surge in displacement rates is mechanical, as displacement can only increase
after year 0 conditional on all workers being employed in year 0. To mitigate this concern, we follow
a matching strategy and create a control panel of workers selected along the same procedure as the
original panel. We use nearest-neighbor matching to select a set of firms that are similar, along a
set of observable characteristics, to the firms emitting a layoff notification, but never emit a layoff
notification.18 We allocate to the matched firm in the control group a placebo event date equal to
the layoff notification date of her nearest-neighbor in the treated group of firms. We then select
workers that are in the control firm at the time of the placebo event date to create our matched
control panel. Results in Figure 8 show that, pre-event, the displacement risk is very similar in
control and treated firms, and that it evolves smoothly in the control firms around the event.
Once a notification is emitted, employers need to come up with the list and dates for the
intended layoffs. These layoffs may happen up to 2 years after the original notification has been
sent. The list needs to follow the last-in-first-out principle, so that relative tenure ranking within
each establishment and occupation group directly determines one’s displacement probability once
a notification has been sent. As a consequence, the effect of a layoff notification on displacement
probability is strongly heterogenous depending on the relative tenure ranking of workers, as shown
in Figure 4 panel B. Workers with relative tenure ranking below .5 have a much higher probability
of being laid-off following a layoff notification than workers with relative tenure ranking above .5.
We exploit this additional layer of variation in displacement risk coming from the interaction
between a notification event and relative tenure ranking. In Figure 9, we show that insurance
choices significantly respond to this shift in displacement risk. Panel A of Figure 9 reports the
evolution of UI coverage around the time of the first layoff notification for the panel of workers
in the treated group and for workers in our placebo (matching) group, restricting the sample to
workers with relative tenure ranking below 50% in year n = 0. The Figure shows that UI coverage
increases significantly among the treated group, starting one year before the layoff notification is
sent, which suggests the existence of some degree of private information among workers regarding
the timing of the layoff notification. The Figure displays the estimated coefficient β2SLS = .84 (.21)
of our two-stage least square model using the layoff event interacted with tenure and a dummy for
being in the treatment group as a risk shifter Z. In panel B, we report similar estimates but for
the sample of workers with relative tenure ranking above 50% in year n = 0. The graph displays
no sign of variation in individuals’ insurance coverage around the event.
Taken together, this evidence, which jointly controls for underlying selection on heterogeneity
µ coming from firm fixed effects and individual fixed effects, strongly suggests that UI choices
do significantly respond to variations in individuals’ underlying unemployment risk. Under the
assumption that there is no other heterogeneity varying jointly with the timing of the notification
18The covariates used for matching are the number of employees, the 4 digit sector codes of the firm, the average
earnings and average years of education of workers in the firm.
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and individuals’ tenure ranking at the time of the notification, Cov(Z, µ) = 0 in this strategy, and
β2SLS 6= 0 provides evidence for direct risk-based selection.
Predicted Risk Model Previous evidence shows that individuals’ displacement probability
varies with many different risk shifters that are beyond the control of individuals’ own actions.
These risk shifters are observable to the econometrician, and therefore, possibly to the insurer as
well. We have so far focused on the effect of risk shifters separately, but now combine them in a
rich and flexible prediction model of individuals’ unemployment risk.
Designing this model serves two purposes. First, by combining flexibly all observable sources
of risk shifting together, the model allows for a richer variation in risk than the one obtained from
using the risk shifters separately. One can then directly test whether insurance choices react to
this richer variation in observable risk. Second, the model is useful from an insurer’s perspective,
as it allows to test how much positive correlation between insurance and risk would be left when
conditioning prices flexibly on the richest set of observable characteristics predicting risk.
The risk outcome that we focus on in our prediction model is the probability of displacement
in t + 1. The risk shifters included in the model are the average firm layoff risk, the full history
of the firm layoff notifications, and the relative tenure ranking of the individual. We also add
the full past unemployment history of the individual. Model selection (e.g., deciding on the best
set of interactions between risk shifters) follows a cross-validation approach where we minimize
misclassification errors in the test sample.
Results are reported in Figure 10. Panel A correlates predicted layoff risk with actual displace-
ment rates in t + 1 and provides evidence that the model performs well in predicting individuals’
risk. Panel B correlates predicted layoff risk with the probability to buy UI coverage, and suggests
again a strong positive correlation between individuals’ risk and their probability to buy the sup-
plemental UI coverage. Interestingly, the graph also suggests that the strong positive correlation
between risk and insurance coverage is mostly driven by what happens at the bottom of the pre-
dicted risk distribution. Between individuals predicted to have a zero risk of displacement and a
2 percent probability of displacement, the fraction buying coverage increases from 60 to 90%. But
the fraction buying UI coverage remains flat, and even decreases slightly as the predicted layoff risk
increases further.
Based on this prediction model, we now investigate how much positive correlation between
insurance and risk there would be if the UI policy used the full extent of this observable information
to condition UI coverage prices on individuals’ predicted risk. To this effect, we use a non-parametric
“Kolmogorov-Smirnov” test similar to the ones used in Section 3.2 above. We partition the data
into 50 cells of predicted layoff risk, and within each cell compute a Pearson’s χ2 test statistic for
independence between insurance coverage in t and displacement in t + 1. Results from this non-
parametric procedure are reported in column (5) of Table 3, and indicate that a significant level
of correlation between insurance and displacement risk remains once we condition on risk levels
predicted from a rich set of observable characteristics.
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5 Beyond Correlation Tests: Variation in Prices
Risk shifters that are exogenous to individuals’ actions are a direct way to test for the presence of
risk-based selection versus a model of “pure moral hazard”. Yet, any selection on unpriced risks -
whether it is direct or through risk-related preference heterogeneity - is relevant from the insurer’s
perspective, as selection along these dimensions will affect the cost of providing the insurance
coverage. An important drawback of using risk shifters is that they may get rid of the indirect
selection that is welfare relevant or introduce selection that is not directly welfare relevant. To
overcome this limitation, we follow a second strategy which relies on exploiting exogenous variation
in prices p, following Einav et al. [2010b].
5.1 Using Variation in Prices
With panel data, exogenous price variation allows us to identify marginals who switch coverage
in response to the price change and thus to rank individuals in three groups, the insured I, the
marginals M and the uninsured U , ordered in terms of their willingness to pay v: EI [v] > EM [v] >
EU [v]. This enables the implementation of a direct non-parametric test for selection by correlating
willingness to pay with risk of individuals observed under the same insurance coverage. Depending
on the available variation in prices, p, one can test for EM [Y0] > EU [Y0] or EI [Y1] > EM [Y1],
or both, where Yk denotes individuals’ risk observed under contract k.
19 Because individuals are
compared under the same coverage, this test is immune to moral hazard and directly identifies
selection. This estimate does not separate what directly comes from risk-based selection and what
comes from selection along unpriced dimensions of heterogeneity that are correlated with risk, such
as for instance selection on MH. Yet, the price variation approach can reveal all the welfare-relevant
selection as it helps tracing out the welfare-relevant cost curves given the unpriced heterogeneity
in the current UI system. We turn to this in Section 6.
5.2 Implementation
We exploit a sudden and unanticipated increase in the premia paid for the supplemental coverage in
2007. The reform followed the surprise ousting of the Social Democrats from government after the
September 2006 general election. With this reform, monthly premia, which had been remarkably
stable over the previous years, suddenly increased from 100 SEK to around 320 SEK on January 1st,
2007, as shown in Figure 11. The Figure also shows that the take-up of the supplemental coverage
responded significantly to this sharp surge in prices. After staying almost constant around 86%,
the fraction of the eligible population buying the comprehensive coverage abruptly dropped to 78%
right after the reform. Interestingly, Figure 11 displays little sign of pre-trends or anticipation in the
take-up rate of the comprehensive coverage, adding credibility to the assumption that this sudden
19The outcomes of interest from the insurer’s perspective are of course the coverage costs under each contract,
Yk = ck. In principle, we would want to see how the costs under the comprehensive coverage Ep[c1] and under the
basic coverage Ep[c0] varies with p. This also allows to account properly for selection on moral hazard. We discuss
this further in Section 6.
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increase in premia, following the surprise change in political majority, was arguably exogenous to
individuals’ willingness to pay v. The unemployment rate was also smoothly decreasing throughout
the period, so that the increase in p cannot be explained by an endogenous pricing response to an
increase in the underlying costs of the comprehensive coverage.20
Non-Parametric Tests of Risk-Based Selection The large response to the 2007 exogenous
change in prices allows for the identification of marginal individuals, individuals who were buying
under the 2006 price regime but are not buying anymore under the 2007 price regime. From
equation (1) describing insurance choices, it is immediate to see that these marginal individuals
must have a willingness to pay for the supplemental coverage v lying between the value of the
premia p pre-2007 and the value of the premia p post-2007.
The identification of marginal individuals therefore enables to rank individuals in three distinct
groups by descending order of their willingness-to-pay v for the supplemental coverage, which we
do in Figure 12. First, the group denoted I of individuals insured both in 2006 and 2007: they
were buying the supplemental coverage in 2006 under the low premia and continue to buy the
supplemental coverage under the high premia, and therefore have the highest level of v. The
marginals M , who were insured in 2006 but switch out in 2007 when premia increase, have a
lower willingness-to-pay for insurance than the always insured I. Finally, individuals who were
neither insured in 2006 nor in 2007, that we denote by U , have the lowest willingness-to-pay for
the supplemental coverage.
Using this ranking, we can now perform direct non-parametric tests for risk-based selection,
by correlating willingness-to-pay with various measures of unemployment risk Y . Because the
marginals and the uninsured are now observed under the same UI coverage (i.e., the basic plan),
the comparison of the average risk of these two groups, EM [Y0] − EU [Y0] is immune to moral
hazard and provides a direct estimate of risk-based selection.21 Comparison of the average risk of
the marginals and the always insured EI [Y1]−EM [Y0] will be a combination of selection and moral
hazard, as these two groups are now observed under different coverages.
Figure 12 presents the results of such non-parametric tests and provides direct compelling
evidence of the presence of risk-based selection into UI. Panel A starts by reporting the average
probability of being displaced in 2008 for each group, while panel B reports the average number
of days spent unemployed in 2008 for each group.22 Both panels clearly show that the average
20If anything, the 2007 premia reform was combined with a minimal legislated decrease in the benefits received
in the comprehensive coverage. On January 1st 2007, the cap on the benefits b1 was slightly decreased for benefits
received in the first 20 weeks of an unemployment spell. Given this reform had only a negligible effect on average
benefits received, we neglect it in the welfare implementation.
21It is worth noting again the timing of the Swedish UI policy: one needs to contribute for at least 12 months in
order to become eligible to the comprehensive benefits b1. Marginals and uninsured in 2007 did not contribute any
premium to the comprehensive plan in 2007. In 2008, if they become unemployed they will therefore get the basic
benefits b0 irrespective of their insurance choice in 2008. In other words, because of their insurance choice in 2007,
marginals and uninsured face the exact same coverage in 2008. The difference in their unemployment risk in 2008
cannot be driven by moral hazard due to different coverage choices in 2008.
22Note that for each risk panel, we report the average outcome of each group conditional on X, the same vector of
controls for contract differentiation that we use in the positive correlation tests. To be precise, we report the average
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unemployment risk in 2008 of the marginals is significantly higher (30% to 40% higher) than that
of the uninsured, despite both groups being eligible to the same coverage in 2008. This is direct
evidence of risk-based selection.
Panels A and B use realized risk outcomes in 2008, i.e., in the year after insurance choices are
made and willingness-to-pay is observed. However, the risk realization in 2008 may fail to fully
capture the unemployment risk faced by an individual when choosing how much coverage to get in
2007, which justifies using risk realizations further into the future, as done previously in the context
of the positive correlation test. In Figure 13 we report the correlation between willingness-to-pay
in 2007 and displacement outcomes in t+1, t+2,... up to t+5. We report in panel A for each
year k ∈ 2008, ...2012, the semi-elasticity (EM [Yk] − EU [Yk])/EU [Yk] of the displacement rate in
year k for the marginals M relative to the uninsured U .23 The Figure reveals a dynamic pattern
comparable to that of Figure 2. The displacement rate of the marginals M is 30% larger than that
of the uninsured in the first years, but the semi-elasticity then decreases as we consider later years.
Yet, it remains statistically significant up to five years.
Panels A and B of Figure 12 also show that the average unemployment risk in 2008 of the
marginals is significantly smaller than that of the always insured. But because marginals and
always insured are eligible to different plans in 2008, and because panels A and B focus on realized
risk outcomes in 2008, once insurance choices are made, this result might be driven by moral
hazard as much as risk-based selection. In panels C and D, we make use of our risk shifters to
look at measures of unemployment risks that are independent of individuals’ own actions, and
therefore immune to individual moral hazard. In panel C, we report for each group the average
firm displacement risk of the firm that individuals are in as of 2006, prior to the price variation.24.
The graph shows a clear monotonic pattern. Compared to the always insured I, the marginals
M are in firms that have a lower layoff risk on average. In other words, individuals are much
more likely to switch out of the comprehensive coverage when they are in a lower risk firm. And
marginals M are still in firms that are more risky on average than the never insured U .
In panel D, we use the predicted risk model presented in the previous subsection, and compute,
using all observable risk shifters, the predicted layoff risk of all individuals based on their observable
characteristics as of 2006, prior to the price variation.25 Panel D shows the average individual
predicted layoff risk of all three groups and shows again clear monotonicity in the relationship
between risk and willingness to pay v. The always insured I have a significantly larger predicted
risk than the marginals M , who also have a significantly larger predicted risk than the uninsured
U .
outcome, fixing the average characteristics X in each group at the same level as that of the uninsured U .
23In panel B, we report the corresponding semi-elasticity (EI [Yk]− EU [Yk])/EU [Yk] for the insured I.
24For each individual i working in firm j, the average firm displacement risk is defined, following Section 4.2, as the
average probability of displacement of all other workers within the firm excluding individual i, pi−i,j over all years
where the firm is observed active in our sample years.
25We fix observable characteristics as of 2006, prior to the price change, as individuals might have changed these
characteristics endogenously in 2007 based on their new insurance coverage choice, which would reintroduce potential
moral hazard.
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Unpriced Observables Figure 12 provides clear and direct evidence of the presence of significant
risk-based selection into the comprehensive UI plan. Interestingly, the 2007 price reform also
enables to investigate how much of this risk-based selection is driven by selection on unpriced
observables correlated with risk, in a similar fashion to what we did in the context of the positive
correlation tests in Section 3.3. To this effect, Figure 14 correlates various unpriced observable
characteristics with individuals willingness-to-pay, following the same strategy as in Figure 12. In
Panel A, we correlate age with willingness-to-pay. The average age of the marginals and the insured
is significantly larger than that of the uninsured, which is in line with the evidence from Section 3.3
that younger individuals are less likely to buy the supplemental coverage, despite having a higher
unemployment risk on average, so that age is providing advantageous selection on average. Yet,
the graph also shows that the magnitude of this selection effect is rather small: the marginals and
the insured are less than one year older than the uninsured on average. Panel B of Figure 14 shows
relatively little selection along education levels. The differences in terms of total number of years
of completed education across groups are quite small (less than .3 years). Panel C correlates the
average displacement probability in the industry that individuals are in as of 2006 with willingness-
to-pay, and confirms that individuals in riskier industries are more likely to buy the comprehensive
UI coverage. Still, the amount of selection based on industry-level risk remains relatively small in
magnitude, and confirms the evidence of Section 3.3 that a large and significant amount of risk-
based selection remains even when controlling for industry-level variations in unemployment risk.
Finally, Panel D investigates the importance of selection based on past unemployment history. The
graph correlates the total number of days spent unemployed in the PES registers from 2002 to 2006
with willingness-to-pay. It again suggests the existence of a strong selection along this dimension:
individuals who have been unemployed in the past have a significantly higher willingness-to-pay for
the comprehensive coverage. Overall, evidence from Figure 14 corroborates previous evidence of
Section 3.3 that unpriced observables have a somewhat limited power in explaining the magnitude of
risk-based selection in the supplemental UI coverage, although one dimension, past unemployment
history, is relatively important in creating adverse selection.
Selection on Preferences The 2007 price reform also allows to investigate patterns of selection
along dimensions other than risk. In Figure 15, we examine how characteristics that proxy for
preferences and for the expected value of having unemployment insurance correlate with willingness-
to-pay for insurance revealed by the 2007 price variation. Panel A correlates the level of individuals’
net wealth in 2006 in thousands of SEK with their willingness-to-pay controlling for age. Individuals
with larger net wealth have more means to smooth consumption in case of displacement, and as
a result, should value extra coverage less. The graph indeed confirms the presence of a clear
monotonic relationship between net wealth and v: the uninsured U have significantly larger net
wealth than the marginals M , who have significantly more net wealth than the insured I. In panel
B, we probe into the amount of selection based on risk-preferences. To proxy for risk aversion, we
use the fraction of total net wealth invested in risky assets (stocks). The graph shows that the
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uninsured U have a significantly larger fraction of risky assets in their portfolio than the marginals
and the insured, conditional on net wealth. This suggests that individuals with higher risk aversion
value the extra coverage more.
Robustness Note that our partition of the population in terms of willingness to pay implicitly
assumes that v is constant over time, or to be more precise that the ranking of individuals’ willing-
ness to pay is the same in 2006 and 2007. In practice v may change over time, due for instance to
idosyncratic shocks to risk, or preferences, thus creating a flow of individuals switching out of the
comprehensive plan, even absent price changes. Appendix Figure A.3 provides evidence that the
flow of individuals who switch out of the supplemental coverage was in fact very small prior to the
2007 price reform, but experienced a sudden surge in 2007. This alleviates the concern that our
ranking of individuals by willingness-to-pay is confounded by underlying changes in individuals’
preferences or risk profiles.
Note also that our partition of the population ignores a negligible fourth group of individuals,
who were not buying the comprehensive plan in 2006, but switched in the comprehensive plan in
2007. The size of this group is seven times smaller than the group of individuals switching out of
the comprehensive plan in 2007. The ranking of this fourth group in terms of willingness-to-pay is
ambiguous, as one would need to include idiosyncratic shocks to v to account for the fact that these
individuals switched in the comprehensive coverage in 2007 despite the increase in prices p. Yet,
the behavior and characteristics of this fourth group provide additional evidence of the presence
of risk-based selection. We display in Appendix Figure A.3 the evolution of the flow of individuals
not buying the comprehensive plan in t − 1 but switching in the comprehensive plan in t. The
graph shows that this flow of individuals was small prior to 2007, and equivalent in size to the flow
of individuals switching out, hence the stability in the fraction of individuals insured displayed in
Figure A.3. But the flow of individuals switching in seems to decrease with the 2007 reform. We
also note that the average unemployment risk of the workers switching into the comprehensive plan
is the highest among the four groups throughout this period.
Summary of empirical evidence We first showed the presence of a large and significant posi-
tive correlation between insurance choices and unemployment risk. Second, we have gone beyond
positive correlation tests, by exploiting both risk variation and price variation. We have shown,
following these two approaches that the positive correlations are not only driven by moral hazard
but also by severe adverse selection into the comprehensive UI coverage. Third, we have shown
that individuals strongly react to variations in their underlying unemployment risk. Fourth, the
current UI policy does not allow prices to be conditioned on many observables correlated with risk.
Yet, we provided clear evidence that even if these observables were priced, severe adverse selection
would remain. Overall, this combined set of empirical results provides direct and compelling ev-
idence that individuals have private information about their unemployment risk, and act on this
asymmetric information when making their unemployment insurance choice, creating large adverse
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selection in the UI market. In the next section, we analyze the policy implications of this large
adverse selection for the optimal design of UI systems.
6 Policy Implications
This section goes beyond the identification of adverse selection and aims to assess what policy can
do to alleviate the potential inefficiencies created by adverse selection. We first provide a direct test
of the desirability of mandating insurance, the standard policy response in UI, using the (partial)
identification of both value and cost of insurance for the same workers. However, a universal
mandate is not the only intervention policy makers can resort to in the face of adverse selection.
To study this, we build on the conceptual framework introduced in Section 3.1, but setting this
up as a government problem where the government mandates a basic insurance plan and allows
individuals to opt for comprehensive insurance at a premium. We use this framework to analyze the
two common choice-based interventions in social insurance programs (and in Sweden’s UI policy):
minimum mandates and subsidies.26 We provide a simple characterization of their welfare impact,
expressed as a function of moments that can be linked to our empirical estimates and allowing
for a concrete evaluation of the UI policy in place. Our framework allows for multi-dimensional
heterogeneity and moral hazard, in the spirit of Einav et al. [2010b], and our policy instruments
involve changes in both insurance premia and coverage, in the spirit of Azevedo and Gottlieb [2017]
and Veiga and Weyl [2016]. Our welfare analysis, however, ignores the presence of other frictions
or inefficiencies (e.g., behavioural frictions, externalities).27
6.1 Efficiency Consequences of Universal Mandate
From an efficiency perspective, an individual should be insured under the comprehensive plan
rather than under the basic plan when the difference in value (i.e., expected utility) for the two
plans exceeds the difference in costs, v ≥ c.28 But from a private perspective, when given the choice,
an individual chooses to buy the comprehensive plan whenever the difference in value exceeds the
difference in price, v ≥ p. When the price differential an individual faces does not reflect the
difference in her costs, choice inefficiencies can arise. A choice inefficiency is characterized by either
p > v > c or c > v ≥ p.
Adversely selected markets, like the UI market in Sweden, are prone to such inefficiencies.
Under average-cost pricing, the sorting of high-risk individuals into the comprehensive plan drives
the price differential up and discourages some individuals from buying the comprehensive coverage,
although for some of these individuals the welfare surplus from the extra coverage may be positive
26The Affordable Care Act is a recent policy intervention in the US health insurance market that involved both
instruments.
27A number of papers document how insurance choices are subject to important frictions [e.g., Abaluck and Gruber
[2011], Handel [2013], Handel and Kolstad [2015]], which can invalidate the use of our revealed preference approach
for welfare purposes [see Spinnewijn [2017]].
28Following earlier notation, we continue to use the bolded notation x ≡ x1 − x0 to define the difference between
the comprehensive and basic UI coverage plan.
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(p > v > c). A standard remedy to this adverse selection problem is to mandate all individuals
to buy comprehensive coverage. However, absent the mandate, some individuals may be efficiently
uninsured (i.e., c > v and p > v). A universal mandate would force even those individuals who
efficiently decide not to buy the extra coverage into buying it, creating another source of inefficiency.
By observing individuals’ choices (revealing v) and insurers’ costs (determining c), we can
compare value to cost and run simple, non-parametric tests to assess the efficiency consequences
of mandating all workers to buy the comprehensive coverage. Such tests have important policy
implications. The level of replacement rates in the comprehensive coverage in Sweden is very close
to the replacement rates of UI mandates in many countries, especially in Europe. The desirability
of mandating such a high level of coverage in UI has never been tested before.
Our non-parametric tests are twofold. First, we focus on individuals from group U , who do not
buy the comprehensive coverage at price p. Using a standard revealed preference argument, we can
bound their value of the extra coverage by the price (i.e., v < p). If the average cost of providing
insurance to this group exceeds the price (i.e., EU (c) > p), it must be that for some individuals
on basic coverage it would be inefficient to mandate comprehensive coverage.
Second, price variation allows to apply a similar test to individuals from group M who are
at the margin of buying comprehensive coverage at price p. It is efficient for marginal buyers
to buy the comprehensive coverage if and only if p >EM (c).
29 If it is inefficient even for the
marginal buyer to buy comprehensive coverage, all of the uninsured may be inefficiently pushed
into buying comprehensive coverage through a universal mandate. However, if the surplus is positive
for marginals and negative for some of the uninsured, one needs to trade off the surplus gained
for those who were inefficiently priced out of the extra coverage and the surplus lost for those who
efficiently decided not to buy the extra coverage, following Einav et al. [2010b].
Implementation Before the 2007 reform in Sweden, workers paid a premium of 100SEK (≈
11USD) per month to get access to comprehensive coverage, but receiving a tax credit of 40 percent
of the premium. On average 14 percent of workers do not buy the extra coverage between 2002 and
2006. The low premium provides an upper bound on their valuation v. We would like to compare
this to the cost of providing the supplemental coverage to this group, EU (c) = EU (c1 − c0). The
challenge is that we only observe these workers under the basic coverage, while the time they spend
unemployed (and thus the cost of providing coverage) is expected to increase for more generous UI.
We can derive a simple lower bound on the cost of providing the supplemental coverage by ignoring
the moral hazard response. That is,
EU (c1|0 − c0) ≤ EU (c1 − c0),
29A natural reason for the cost of insurance to exceed its value to a risk-averse worker is the presence of moral
hazard. People do not internalize the consequences of their decrease in efforts on the insurer. Another reason is that
people underestimate the value of insurance, either because they underestimate the coverage or the risk itself.
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where cx|y denotes the cost of providing plan x given the behavior under plan y. This lower bound
equals 560SEK per year, compared to an annual premium of 720SEK (accounting for the tax paid
on UI benefits and the tax credit received on the premium). Since the lower bound on the cost is
only just below the premium, the presence of a small moral hazard response of εpi,b ∼= .3 (in the
lower tail of estimates of unemployment elasticities [see Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016]]) would
push the costs above so that they would exceed the upper bound on the workers’ valuation. We
therefore conclude that on average the workers not buying comprehensive coverage are doing this
efficiently as they value the coverage less than its costs. Hence, imposing a universal mandate that
forces them to buy the comprehensive coverage would be inefficient.
To go beyond this first test and provide finer conclusions on the efficiency consequences of a
mandate, we need to estimate how the cost of both insurance plans change with workers’ valuation.
For this, we need to overcome the challenge that the counterfactual cost of an insurance plan not
taken by a worker is unobserved. We do two things. First, the price variation in Section 5.2
allows us to identify an intermediate group of buyers M , closer to the margin, and get a finer
assessment of how costs change with valuation than when comparing the group of insured I and
uninsured U for one given price. Second, we combine our adverse selection estimates in Section
5.2 and the observed costs of providing the comprehensive plan to I and the basic plan to U
respectively to get the counterfactual cost for the other groups of workers.30 In particular, we use
our predicted risk model (see Panel D of Figure 12) to extrapolate the observed cost of providing
basic coverage EU (c0) to the workers with higher valuation and the observed cost of providing
comprehensive coverage EI (c1) to the workers with lower valuation. This extrapolation requires
that the risk-based selection is proportional to the selection on predicted risks and that selection
on moral hazard is absent, as we explain in detail in Appendix B.
Our implementation provides us with an estimate of the cost of both the comprehensive plan and
the basic plan for each group of workers X ∈ {I,M,U}, which we extrapolate linearly to obtain the
respective cost curves shown in Panel B of Figure 16. The difference between these two curves gives
us the cost of supplemental coverage EX (c1 − c0). Our simple approach accounts for moral hazard
responses and implies an unemployment risk elasticity εpi,b ∼= .6, which falls well in the range of
recent estimates in the literature [see Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016]]. The approach, however,
assumes that the moral hazard response is constant across workers with different valuations (i.e.,
there is no selection on moral hazard). We carefully assess in Appendix B the sensitivity of our
results to selection on moral hazard and find that they are quite robust.
Panel A of Figure 16 puts the cost curve for supplemental coverage together with the demand
curve that it corresponds to. These curves thus show the value and corresponding cost for workers
ranked based on their valuation of the supplemental coverage. The graph allows for a direct visual
assessment of the welfare impact of mandating comprehensive coverage: value is indeed below cost
for a substantial share of workers. Both the cost and demand curves are based on linear extrapola-
30Note that with sufficient price variation (both positive and negative), we could avoid our extrapolation and simply
trace out non-parametrically both the cost curve for the comprehensive coverage and the cost curve for the basic
coverage.
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tions. For the linear demand curve, we use the share of individuals buying the the comprehensive
plan before and after the premium increase in 2007. The 8 percent of workers who switch out of the
comprehensive plan with the price reform value the supplemental insurance somewhere between
the pre-reform price of 720SEK and the average post-reform price of 4, 116SEK. The cost curve
Ep (c) is a piecewise linear interpolation of our estimates of the costs for the supplemental coverage
for the insured, marginals and uninsured. The implied cost for the individuals switching out of the
comprehensive plan ranges between 1, 442SEK and 1, 582SEK. We find that for workers who are
marginal at the pre-reform price it is not efficient to buy comprehensive coverage, while it is for
workers who are at the margin for the post-reform price. The premium at which value and cost
coincide equals 1, 477SEK, at which 84 percent of workers would buy insurance.
In sum, our implementation indicates that in Sweden insurance choices are efficient for workers
who bought comprehensive coverage at the higher post-reform price and for those who did not at
the low pre-reform price. Mandating the latter individuals to buy comprehensive insurance would
decrease welfare. This result is interesting. It shows that despite severe adverse selection into
comprehensive coverage, a mandate of such generous coverage is inefficient in Sweden. This result
has important implications more broadly, as it clearly raises the question whether the universal
mandates of generous UI coverages observed in many other countries are socially desirable.
6.2 Choice-based Policy Interventions
When a universal mandate is not desirable, the question remains how to intervene in an adversely
selected market while allowing for choice? We analyze two choice-based interventions that are
standard in insurance markets and often used in combination: a subsidy, which induces people to
buy more coverage and reduces under-insurance due to adverse selection, and a minimum mandate,
which increases coverage for people who are potentially priced out of the market and thus mitigates
the consequences of adverse selection.
We analyze these two interventions in a setting where the government designs a basic insurance
plan (b0, p0) and a comprehensive insurance plan (b1, p1), between which workers choose, and aims
to maximize social welfare:
W =
∫
v≥p
ω (v1 − p1) dG (v) +
∫
v<p
ω (v0 − p0) dG (v)
+ λ {F [p1 − EI (c1)] + (1− F ) [p0 − EU (c0)]} ,
where λ equals the marginal cost of public funds, pre-multiplying the expected surplus on the
unemployment policy, and F = 1 − G(p) equals the share of individuals buying comprehensive
insurance (group I). The function ω (·) maps individuals’ consumer surplus into welfare and we
denote by gj = ω
′ (vj − pj) the marginal social gain from a dollar when buying plan j.
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6.2.1 Subsidy
A subsidy lowers the price of coverage and induces more individuals to buy it. A subsidy achieves
the same outcome as a universal mandate in the extreme case that it induces everyone to buy
insurance. A subsidy, however, can aim to specifically target individuals for whom the surplus is
positive.
We consider the determination of a subsidy in our stylized framework where coverage and
prices are set by the government. We define the subsidy for supplemental coverage S as the wedge
between the difference in average cost of providing comprehensive coverage vs. basic coverage and
the difference in prices charged,
S ≡ [EI (c1)− EU (c0)]− [p1 − p0] .
The difference in average cost can be decomposed in three parts: the actual cost of providing
the supplemental coverage, a moral hazard response to the supplemental coverage, and risk-based
selection into coverage,
EI (c1)− EU (c0) = EU
(
c1|0 − c0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mechanical
+ EU
(
c1 − c1|0
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MH
+ EI (c1)− EU (c1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection
. (10)
From an efficiency perspective, the premium p should definitely reflect the cost from providing
the supplemental coverage, either due to the mechanical increase in coverage (1st term in (10))or
the behavioral increase due to moral hazard (2nd term in (10)). However, the premium should
not reflect the difference in average risks between those who buy the supplemental coverage and
those who do not. The subsidy for supplemental coverage allows the government to move a way
from average-cost pricing, but also redistributes from those buying basic coverage to those buying
comprehensive coverage.
To illustrate the efficiency-equity trade-off, we consider the welfare impact of a small increase in
the subsidy dS. This change reduces the price for comprehensive coverage by dp1 = − (1− F ) dS
and increases the price for basic coverage by dp0 = FdS. Absent any behavioural responses, the
government’s revenues would remain the same. However, the increased subsidy will change the
selection into insurance by making comprehensive insurance more attractive.
The small change in the subsidy allows us to invoke the envelope theorem: the impact on agents’
welfare only depends on the direct effect of the price changes. The selection response into insurance
has a first-order impact on the budget, but not on the agents’ welfare. That is, the welfare gain
from inducing buyers at the margin (i.e., v = p) to buy comprehensive insurance simplifies to the
corresponding fiscal externality,
AS ≡ p− EM (c) = [EI (c1)− EM (c1)] + [EM (c0)− EU (c0)]− S.
Two insights come out of this simple expression. First, by relating the prices to average costs,
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we see that both adverse selection into the comprehensive plan and advantageous selection into
the basic plan increase the inefficient wedge between price and marginal costs. That is, with
adverse selection, individuals at the margin tend to be cheaper than the average consumer of the
comprehensive plan (EI (c1) > EM (c1)), but also more expensive than the average consumer of the
basic plan (EM (c0) > EU (c0)). Hence, by inducing the marginals to switch to more comprehensive
coverage a budgetary gain is realized at both margins. However, this realized gain in the budgetary
costs of both plans comes at the expense of the subsidy already in place. Second, the expression for
the fiscal externality AS confirms that moral hazard by itself (i.e., c1 > c1|0) does not contribute
to the pricing inefficiency. The impact of moral hazard on the cost differential would be priced
efficiently under average-cost pricing if there is no risk-based selection into insurance (i.e., Ek (cj)
does not depend on k for j = 1, 2).31
The optimal subsidy trades off the fiscal externality and the redistributive consequences, as
summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. For given coverage levels (b0, b1), the price subsidy S is optimal only if[
1− EM (c)
p
]
× ε 1−F
F
,p =
EU (g0)− EI (g1)
λ
.
The left-hand side of Proposition 1 can be interpreted as the fiscal return to a marginal dollar
transferred from the uninsured to the insured due to the reduced adverse selection. This depends
on the responsiveness of the demand for supplemental coverage to its price and how much the price
exceeds the cost of providing the supplemental coverage to those who respond. The right-hand
side can be interpreted as the redistributive cost (or gain if negative) from transferring a marginal
dollar from the uninsured to the insured. In the absence of redistributive motives, the optimal
subsidy is such that prices reflect the cost of providing insurance to individuals at the margin,
i.e., p = EM (c). Increasing the subsidy further causes the fiscal externality to be negative (i.e.,
p < EM (c)) and can be justified by valuing the redistribution from the uninsured to the insured.
However, if value remains below cost for individuals with lower valuation, the redistributive motive
from the uninsured to the insured cannot justify inducing everyone to buy comprehensive insurance,
as the relative weight of the (negative) fiscal externality goes to infinity when F goes to 1. In other
words, a universal mandate can only be the optimal policy if value exceeds cost.
Implementation In Sweden the difference in average costs of providing comprehensive vs.
basic coverage was equal to 2, 840SEK between 2002 and 2006. We can use our estimates of the
observed and counterfactual costs to decompose this difference as in equation (10). We find that
53% of the difference in average costs is driven by adverse selection, while 27% of the difference
is due to moral hazard and the remaining 20% is mechanical.32 This decomposition shows the
substantial role played by adverse selection and already hints at the desirability of a large subsidy.
31As discussed earlier, risk-based selection can be driven by so-called selection on moral hazard (see Einav et al.
[2013]), or more generally, any heterogeneity in efforts under either the comprehensive or basic coverage.
32The details underlying this implementation are again in Appendix B
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Before the price reform in 2007 the premium for supplemental coverage paid only for 25% of
the difference in average costs. The cost of providing supplemental coverage to individuals at the
margin is about twice as high as the premium. The subsidy thus inefficiently induces individuals
at the margin to buy insurance causing a negative fiscal externality. In principle, setting the
subsidy as high can still be rationalized by valuing the redistribution towards workers buying the
comprehensive coverage. The fiscal cost depends on the fiscal externality per marginal worker
(1 − EM (c) /p = −1.0) and the price elasticity of (marginal) workers (ε 1−F
F
,p = .09), which is
estimated to be low due to the modest demand response to the substantial price increase in 2007.
The large pre-reform subsidy would thus be optimal if the return from redistributing to the insured
equals 9%. The 2007 reform reduced the subsidy dramatically and, in fact, set the premium above
the difference in average costs. This indicates that, conditional on the coverage levels, the inelastic
demand would still hold this adversely selected market together when pricing at average cost.33
6.2.2 Minimum mandate
A minimum mandate provides protection against unemployment risk for workers who are priced
out of the market for comprehensive coverage. With adverse selection, these workers are the ones
with the lowest risk. The challenge is that increasing the basic coverage is particularly attractive to
individuals with higher risk and thus makes the selection into comprehensive coverage even more
adverse. A minimum mandate thus needs to trade off the protection to individuals who do not
buy comprehensive coverage at equilibrium prices against further reducing the share of individuals
buying comprehensive coverage. The welfare impact of the latter depends on how generous the
subsidy is.
To illustrate this trade-off, we consider a small change in the basic coverage level b0. Absent any
selection effects, an increase in basic coverage provides more insurance to the group of workers with
this coverage, but also reduces their incentives to avoid unemployment. This standard trade-off
between insurance and incentives is captured by the well-known Baily-Chetty formula [Baily [1978],
Chetty [2006]]. This formula compares the consumption smoothing gains, depending on the relative
marginal utility when unemployed Eu
′(b)−λ
λ , and the fiscal cost, captured by the unemployment
elasticity εEpi,b. When considering a change in the minimum benefit level, these moments should
be evaluated for workers on basic coverage. On average, these workers value coverage less as they
opt out of supplemental coverage, but at the margin, they may value coverage more as they are
less covered.
Another key difference with the standard formula comes from the fact that the selection of
workers changes in response to the benefit change. An increase in coverage makes the basic in-
surance plan more attractive and especially so to workers with higher unemployment risk. The
corresponding fiscal externality depends on how the cost of supplemental coverage compares to the
premium for those who switch to the basic coverage level, i.e., EM(b0) (c) /p. This effect corresponds
33Note that the inelastic response may be due to high inertia [see Handel [2013]]. If it were frictional demand that
overcomes the pricing inefficiency, this would change the welfare evaluation [see Handel et al. [2015]].
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to the sorting effect identified by Veiga and Weyl [2016].34 Note that if workers only differed in
their risk, the buyers at the margin responding to a change in UI benefits would be the same as
when changing the subsidy. This is no longer true with multi-dimensional heterogeneity.35,36 We
can state the following result:
Proposition 2. The minimum mandate b0 is optimal, for given subsidy S and comprehensive
coverage b1, only if
EU (g0 × u′ (b0))− λ
λ
− εEU (pi),b0 =
[
1− EM(b0) (c)
p
]
× p
EU (c0)
× ε1−F,b0.
The proposition delivers two important insights for the design of social insurance more generally:
First, it clearly identifies and provides an implementable characterization of the trade-off be-
tween mitigating the consequence of adverse selection at the extensive margin and worsening adverse
selection at the intensive margin. This trade-off is also studied by Azevedo and Gottlieb [2017]
who provide a general characterization of equilibrium contracts and prices in a competitive market
(with multi-dimensional heterogeneity). Their analysis shows how setting a minimum mandate can
discourage individuals from buying even more coverage as the mandate effectively pools agents in
the lowest range of unemployment risks into the minimum coverage plan and as such reduces its
equilibrium price.37 The mechanisms are very related: increasing the minimum mandate provides
a more attractive alternative for workers attracted to more comprehensive coverage, either by in-
creasing the available coverage or lowering the price.38 This insight also provides an important
perspective on the general absence of private UI, which has been attributed to adverse selection
by Hendren [2017]. Indeed, the absence of private UI concerns more specifically the absence of
supplemental coverage above and beyond the mandated public UI that is already in place. Adverse
34Veiga and Weyl [2016] characterize the single-traded contract firms offer in an insurance market (with multi-
dimensional heterogeneity). Private firms face a similar trade-off in determining the optimal coverage level between
creating insurance value and discouraging higher risk from selection into their plan (i.e., cream-skimming). Interest-
ingly, a private firm does not internalize the consequences for competing insurers from attracting different risk types.
That is, the negative sorting effect for a private firm increasing b0 equals p0 − EM(b0)c0, which underestimates the
total impact, equal to [p0 − EM(b0)c0 −
(
p1 − EM(b0)c1
)
]. We briefly discuss this further in Appendix C.
35The sorting effect depends on covariance between the marginal utility of coverage and the cost to the insurer (see
Veiga and Weyl [2016]). Indeed, we can re-write the marginal cost term as
EM(b0) (c) =
E (c|p) + cov
(
c, ∂v
∂b0
|p
)
E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
 , (11)
illustrating that the marginal cost term will be higher than for the subsidy if costs are positively correlated with
marginal value. This would occur naturally with heterogeneity in risks. However, if there is only heterogeneity in
risks, the covariance among the marginals equals zero.
36See Ericson et al. [2015] for an analysis of differential responses to changes in coverage and changes in prices
depending on the heterogeneity in risks and preferences. In advantageously selected markets, the increase in minimum
coverage could as well attract types with lower unemployment risk (but higher risk aversion).
37See also Finkelstein [2004] and Chetty and Saez [2010] for related analyses.
38For completeness, we provide a characterization for the optimal comprehensive contract b1 in Appendix C. Note
that the trade-off faced in setting the comprehensive coverage, either for the social planner or for profit-maximizing
firms, will change when the basic coverage will change.
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selection may be less constraining if the public mandate entailed a lower coverage level.39
Second, the proposition highlights the complementarity between subsidies and mandates. The
welfare impact of the selection effect critically depends on the subsidy in place. The fiscal cost
of increasing adverse selection is lower for a higher subsidy, making a higher minimum mandate
more desirable. More generally, while the minimum mandate worsens adverse selection into the
supplemental market (or even excludes the viability of a private market as in Hendren [2017]), this
inefficiency can be countered by a more generous subsidy for supplemental coverage.40,41
Implementation In Sweden the minimum UI benefit equals 320SEK (≈ 35USD) a day,
which corresponds to 20 percent of median pre-unemployment earnings. The value of increasing this
level depends on the consumption smoothing gains provided by the additional coverage. Landais
and Spinnewijn [2017] estimate an average consumption drop of around 10% during unemployment
for workers on basic coverage, implying a return to a marginal kroner spent on basic coverage of 20
percent for relative risk-aversion γ = 2.42 This insurance value needs to be traded off against the
fiscal cost due to moral hazard and adverse selection. A large literature has estimated moral hazard
responses finding a large range of elasticities (see Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016]). As mentioned
before, our estimates imply an elasticity εpi,b = .6, suggesting that the moral hazard cost would well
be above the consumption smoothing gain of .2 and thus that the minimum mandate would be set
too high. Note, however, that the consumption-based implementation is likely to provide a lower
bound on the consumption smoothing gains [see Chetty [2008], Chetty and Finkelstein [2013]].43
More importantly, we still need to correct the cost of increasing the minimum mandate for
the fiscal externality due to adverse selection. In an adversely selected market, we would expect
this fiscal externality to further increase the cost. However, due the large subsidy pre-reform in
Sweden, the fiscal externality is actually negative and thus reduces the gap between insurance value
39As discussed before, we find that a large majority of Swedish workers continues to buy the supplemental coverage
when priced just above average cost. Hendren [2013] shows formally that the existence of a (supplemental) market
requires that individuals are willing to pay a markup for insurance that exceeds the cost imposed by worse risks
adversely selecting their contract. Note that this markup decreases as the basic coverage level increases for risk-
averse agents. Moreover, the variation in willingness-to-pay coming from heterogeneity in risk aversion decreases as
the basic coverage becomes more generous (see Ericson et al. [2015]). This strenghtens the risk-based selection and
thus increases the “pooled price ratio”.
40See also the simulations in Azevedo and Gottlieb [2017] showing that subsidizing supplemental coverage increases
welfare.
41A similar complementarity was stated in the seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] showing that by
subsidizing the comprehensive coverage (for the “high-risk” type), the basic coverage can be increased (for the “low-
risk” type) while maintaining incentive compatibility.
42Using a Taylor approximation, the difference in marginal utilities when employed vs. unemployed simplifies to
the drop in consumption between employment and unemployment, multiplied by the relative risk-aversion [Gruber
[1997], Chetty [2006]].
43Using an alternative revealed-preference approach, Landais and Spinnewijn [2017] find that the average return
of the supplemental coverage b for workers who choose not to buy it at price p is bounded from above by
p
EU
(
c1|0 − c0
) − 1.
This upper bound on the average return equals .29 in the Swedish context, but may still be lower than the marginal
return to supplemental coverage, evaluated at b0.
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and moral hazard cost (and could reverse it in principle). Taking both the fiscal externality of a
subsidy and the demand response to a change in the subsidy as lower bounds, we find a downward
correction of the moral hazard cost of at least .09.44 This correction, however, would be smaller and
eventually change signs for lower subsidies, illustrating the complementarity between the minimum
mandate and the subsidy.
7 Conclusion
Seventy five years ago, the Beveridge Report, in its attempt at increasing welfare for all, by recom-
mending a new set of revolutionary social insurance policies, insisted that these insurance policies
“must be achieved by co-operation between the State and the individual. (...) The state should
not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a national minimum, it should leave
room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than that min-
imum for himself and his family”.45 In the context of unemployment insurance though, generous
mandates have left very little room for choice and voluntary actions by individuals, under the
(untested) rationale that offering choice would trigger risk-based selection. Our paper provides the
first direct evidence for risk-based selection into unemployment insurance and offers new insights
on how to reconcile social insurance design with individual choice in such a context of adverse
selection.
Using various empirical strategies and different sources of variation, we robustly find that work-
ers who face higher (ex-ante) unemployment risk select into more comprehensive coverage. We
further leverage our rich administrative data to show that the severe adverse selection is expected
to survive when workers’ observable risks were to be priced. Despite the severe adverse selection,
we find that mandating all workers into comprehensive coverage is not the best policy response.
The Swedish workers who choose not buy the comprehensive coverage value it below its cost. This
simple observation sheds new light on the universal mandates of comprehensive UI that are in place
around the world – the desirability of which has never been tested before. Moreover, the ubiquitous
absence of private markets for UI may be precisely because of the mandated public programs in
place and the adverse selection into supplemental coverage they cause. As our analysis shows, the
impact of adverse selection can be mitigated by subsidizing the premia for more comprehensive
coverage, which would increase the desirability of a more generous minimum mandate.
44As shown before, the fiscal externality of a subsidy is indeed a lower bound when costs and marginal value of
coverage are positively correlated. Regarding the demand elasticity, we note that a risk-neutral worker values the
supplemental coverage at pib−p and thus responds proportionally to a change in coverage or in prices. A risk-averse
worker responds relatively more to a change in coverage. Hence,
ε1−F,b0 ≥ ε1−F,p
pib0
p
= Fε 1−F
F
,p
EM (c0)
p
.
This implies
p
EU (c0)
× ε1−F,b0 ≥
EM (c0)
EU (c0)
Fε 1−F
F
,p
,
which corresponds to .088 in our Swedish context.
45Beveridge [1942]
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The value of providing choice in social insurance programs does rely on individuals using this
choice in their best interest. This is an assumption we have maintained throughout our analysis. A
rapidly growing literature documents the importance of frictions distorting households’ insurance
choices. This introduces another important caveat when introducing choice, closely related to the
potential for adverse selection. We leave this challenging, but important issue for future research.
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Figure 1: Positive Correlation Tests - Baseline
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Notes: The Figure reports estimates of positive correlation tests following specification (3) estimated over the
period 2002-2006 for four different realized risk outcomes: total UI claims under comprehensive coverage in t + 1,
total duration spent unemployed in t+1, the probability of displacement in t+1, and the probability of displacement
in t+ 1 but excluding quits. Total UI benefit claims are defined as the total amount of UI benefits that individuals
would be collecting in t+1 were they to buy the comprehensive coverage and receive benefits b1. For individuals who
do not buy the comprehensive coverage in t, we computed the counterfactual benefit claims they would have if they
were to receive the comprehensive benefits. For each outcome, the chart displays γˆ/Y¯ , that is the semi-elasticity of
the realized risk outcomes in t+1 with respect to insurance choices in t. Specification (3) controls for year fixed effects
and for the limited set of characteristics that affect the unemployment insurance coverage available to individuals: a
dummy for whether individuals meet the work eligibility requirement, a dummy for union membership, and earnings
level. See text for details. For all realized risk outcomes, we find a strong and significant positive correlation with UI
coverage choice.
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Figure 2: Positive Correlation Tests - Dynamics
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Notes: Risk realization in t + 1 may fail to fully capture the unemployment risk faced by an individual as she is
making her coverage choice at time t, which justifies using risk realizations for that individual further into the future.
This Figure reports the correlation of insurance choice in t with displacement outcomes in t + 1, t + 2,... up to
t+ 8. The Figure displays estimates of positive correlation tests following specification (3) estimated over the period
2002-2006. For each outcome, the chart displays γˆk/Y¯ , that is the semi-elasticity of the realized displacement rate in
t+ k with respect to insurance choices in t. For each displacement outcome in year t+ k, we control for displacement
outcomes in previous years (t+ k − 1, t+ k − 2, etc.), for year fixed effects and for the limited set of characteristics
X that affect the unemployment insurance coverage available to individuals. See text for details.
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Figure 3: Positive Correlation Tests - Role of Unpriced Heterogeneity
A. Semi-elasticity from linear specification
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B. Correlation from bivariate probit
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Notes: The Figure explores to what extent the positive correlation between insurance and unemployment risk is
driven by selection on observables characteristics that are unpriced in the Swedish UI system. In panel A, we start
with the baseline positive correlation test from the linear specification (3) where Y is the probability of displacement
in t + 1, and show how the semi-elasticity γˆ/Y¯ evolves as we add sequentially more characteristics to the vector of
controls X. We start by adding demographic controls (age, then gender, and marital status), then controls for skills
and other labor market characteristics (controls for education (four categories), industry (1-digit code), occupation
(1-digit code) and wealth level (quartiles). We finally add controls for past unemployment history (dummies for
having been unemployed in t-1, t-2 and up to t-8). In panel B, we do a similar positive correlation exercize but using
a bivariate probit specification instead. We report how the estimated correlation ρ between the two error terms 
and η from the bivariate probit specification (4) evolves when adding sequentially to the vector X the same set of
characteristics as in panel A.
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Figure 4: Risk shifters: Firm Displacement Risk & Last-in-first-out Principle
A. Firm Displacement Risk vs Individual Displacement Probability in t+ 1
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B. Relative Tenure Ranking in year t vs Displacement Probability in year t+ 1
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Notes: The Figure provides evidence of the role of firm level risk and of the Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) principle in
creating variation in individuals’ unemployment risks. In panel A, we provide evidence of the role of firm layoff risk
as a shifter of individuals’ own displacement probability. For each individual i working in firm j, we define average
firm displacement risk as the average probability of displacement of all other workers within the firm excluding
individual i, pi−i,j over all years where the firm is observed active in our sample years. We then plot the average firm
displacement risk in 20 bins of equal population size, against the individual probability of displacement in t+ 1. The
Figure shows that there is significant heterogeneity in firms’ separation rates, and that individuals’ unemployment
risk is very strongly correlated with firm level risk. Panel B plots the probability of being displaced in t + 1 among
individuals working in firms that emit a layoff notification in t + 1, as a function of relative tenure ranking within
establishment and occupation in year t. See Section 2 for institutional details. The Figure provides clear evidence of
a strong negative correlation between relative tenure ranking and individuals’ displacement probability.
Figure 5: Firm Level Risk and UI coverage choice
A. Baseline controls for contract space
Individual-level model
βOLS = .108 (.001)
β2SLS = .502 (.013)
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B. With additional demographic controls
Individual-level model
βOLS = .082 (.003)
β2SLS = .245 (.028)
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Notes: The Figure uses cross-sectional variation in displacement risk across firms as a risk shifter to estimate how UI
coverage choices react to variation in risk that is not driven by individual moral hazard. Panel A groups individuals
in 50 equal size bins of firm layoff risk, and plot their average firm layoff risk against their average probability of
buying supplemental coverage, residualized on the same vector X of baseline controls affecting UI contracts used in
the positive correlation test of Section 3.2. We report on the graph the coefficient βOLS from an OLS regression of
specification (7) and then the estimated coefficient β2SLS from our two-stage least square model (8) where we use
Z = pi−i,j as a risk shifter. In panel B, we replicate the same procedure, but now add to the regression the same rich
set of additional controls used in Section 3.3, and find a similar strong positive correlation between insurance choices
and firm layoff risk.
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Figure 6: Firm Switchers - Displacement Rate in t+ 1 as a function of time to/since
firm switch
A. All Switchers
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B. Switchers Experiencing Large Positive Firm Layoff Risk Shock
vs Large Negative Firm Layoff Risk Shock
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Notes: The Figure focuses on “firm switchers”, i.e. individuals moving from having a labor contract with firm
j to having a contract with firm k, without any recorded non-employment spell between these two contracts. We
focus on individuals with more than 1 year of tenure in the origin firm. Switchers experience a variation in their
layoff risk coming from underlying variation in both risk shifters: their tenure ranking changes, and so does their
underlying firm layoff risk. In panel A, we display estimates of the event study specification (9) using displacement
risk in t + 1 as an outcome. The graph shows that the displacement risk increases sharply and significantly at the
time of the firm switch. In panel B, we split the population of switchers according to their rank in the distribution
of ∆j,j′pi−i = pi−i,j′ − pi−i,j , the change in their underlying firm risk when moving from firm j to firm j′. We focus
on individuals in the bottom decile of ∆j,j′pi−i (large negative shock, i.e., individuals going from a high risk to a low
risk firm), and individuals in the top decile of ∆j,j′pi−i (large positive shock).
Figure 7: Firm Switchers - UI coverage choices as a function of time to/since firm
switch
A. All Switchers
Individual
switches firm
Effect of Displacement Risk in t+1
on UI coverage
2SLS model : switch
β2SLS=.872 (.024)
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B. Switchers Experiencing Large Positive Firm Layoff Risk Shock
vs Large Negative Firm Layoff Risk Shock
Individual
switches firm
Effect of Displacement Risk in t+1
on UI coverage
2SLS model : switch X shock size 
β2SLS=.569 (.077)
-.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
to
 B
uy
 U
I C
ov
er
ag
e
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Event Time (years since/to switch)
Large negative shock
Large positive shock
Notes: The Figure focuses on “firm switchers”. In panel A, we display estimates of the event study specification (9)
using UI coverage V as an outcome. The Figure shows that the probability of buying the comprehensive coverage
increases sharply at the time of the firm switch. In panel B, we split the population of switchers according to their
rank in the distribution of ∆j,j′pi−i = pi−i,j′ − pi−i,j , the change in their underlying firm risk when moving from firm
j to firm j′, as in Figure 6 panel B. The graph indicates that the increase in the probability to buy UI around firm
switch is significantly larger among individuals moving to significantly more risky firms relative to those moving to
less risky firms. On both panels, we display the coefficient from a two-stage least square fixed-effect specification
similar to (8) where we use firm switch (and firm switch interacted with shock size) as risk shifter Z for individual
displacement probability.
Figure 8: Layoff Notification and Displacement Risk
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Notes: The Figure reports estimates of the evolution of the displacement probability of workers around the first layoff
notification event in the history of the establishment. We define event year n = 0 as the year in which an establishment
emits its first layoff notification, and focus on the panel of workers who are employed in the estbalishment at the
date this layoff notification is emitted to the PES. The graph shows that a layoff notification is indeed associated
with a sudden and large increase in the displacement risk of workers. Because the panel of workers is selected based
on being employed in the firm in year n = 0, one may worry that this surge in displacement rates is mechanical, as
displacement can only increase after year 0 conditional on all workers being employed in year 0. To mitigate this
concern, we follow a matching strategy and create a control panel of workers selected along the same procedure as the
original panel. We use nearest-neighbor matching to select a set of firms that are similar, along a set of observable
characteristics, to the firms emitting a layoff notification, but never emit a layoff notification. We allocate to the
matched firm in the control group a placebo event date equal to the layoff notification date of her nearest-neighbor
in the treated group of firms. We then select workers that are in the control firm at the time of the placebo event
date to create our matched control panel.
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Figure 9: Layoff Notification
A. Workers With Relative Tenure Ranking < .5 at Event Time 0
Reduced form estimate: .0171 (.004)
β2SLS: .832 (.207)
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B. Workers With Relative Tenure Ranking ≥ .5 at Event Time 0
Reduced form estimate: -.0002 (.005)
β2SLS: .003 (.102)
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Notes: The Figure uses layoff notification events interacted with relative tenure ranking as a source of variation in
displacement risk to investigate how UI coverage choices react to variations in underlying risk. Panel A reports the
evolution of UI coverage around the time of the first layoff notification for the panel of workers in the treated group
and for workers in our placebo (control) group, restricting the sample to workers with relative tenure ranking below
50% in year n = 0. The Figure shows that UI coverage increases significantly among the treated group, starting one
year before the layoff notification is sent, which suggests the existence of some degree of private information among
workers regarding the timing of the layoff notification. In panel B, we report similar estimates but for the sample of
workers with relative tenure ranking above 50% in year n = 0. The graph displays no sign of variations in individuals
insurance coverage among the event. On both panels, we display the estimated coefficient β2SLS of our two-stage
least square model using the layoff event interacted with tenure and a dummy for being in the treatment group as a
risk shifter Z.
Figure 10: Predicted Layoff Risk Model
A. Predicted Layoff Risk vs Actual Displacement Rates
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Notes: The Figure reports results from the model of predicted displacement risk in t+ 1, presented in Section 4.2.
The model combines flexibly all observable sources of risk shifting together, and allows for a richer variation in risk
than the one obtained from using the risk shifters separately. The risk shifters included in the model are the average
firm layoff risk, the full history of the firm layoff notifications, and the relative tenure ranking of the individual. We
also add the full past unemployment history of the individual. Model selection follows a cross-validation approach
where we minimize misclassification errors in the test sample. Panel A correlates predicted layoff risk with actual
displacement rates in t+ 1 and provides evidence that the model performs well in predicting individuals’ risk. Panel
B correlates predicted layoff risk with the probability to buy UI coverage in t, and suggests again a strong positive
correlation between individuals’ risk and their probability to buy the supplemental UI coverage. Interestingly, the
graph also suggests that the strong positive correlation between risk and insurance coverage is mostly driven by what
happens at the bottom of the predicted risk distribution.
Figure 11: Price Variation: evolution of premia p and of the fraction of workers
insured around the 2007 reform
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Notes: The Figure reports the evolution of monthly premium for the supplemental UI coverage over time. As
explained in Section 2, there are no sources of premium differentiation up to 2008, apart from small rebates for union
members and for unemployed individuals. Here, we report the value of the premium for employed union members.
The Figure shows a large and sudden increase in the premia paid for the supplemental coverage in 2007. This increase
followed the surprise ousting of the Social Democrats from government after the September 2006 general election.
Note that from July 2008 on, premia started to be differentiated across UI funds. For 2008 and 2009 we therefore
report the average monthly premium among unemployed union members across all UI funds. The Figure also shows
the evolution of the take-up of the supplemental UI coverage, measured as the sum of all individuals buying the
supplemental coverage divided by the total number of individuals aged 18 to 60 meeting the eligibility criteria for
receiving UI benefits.
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Figure 12: Price Variation: Unemployment Risk by willingness-to-pay v
A. Displacement Prob. in 2008 B. Total Unemp. Duration in 2008
.
00
5
.
01
.
01
5
.
02
Insured in 2006 and 2007 Insured in 2006 only Uninsured in 2006 and 2007
.
8
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
Insured in 2006 and 2007 Insured in 2006 only Uninsured in 2006 and 2007
C. Firm Layoff Risk D. Predicted Displ. Risk Based on Observables
.
08
2
.
08
4
.
08
6
.
08
8
.
09
Insured in 2006 and 2007 Insured in 2006 only Uninsured in 2006 and 2007
.
01
4
.
01
6
.
01
8
.
02
.
02
2
.
02
4
Insured in 2006 and 2007 Insured in 2006 only Uninsured in 2006 and 2007
Notes: The Figure uses the 2007 price reform to rank individuals according to their willingness-to-pay for the supple-
mental coverage v, and then uses this ranking to correlate willingness-to-pay with various measures of unemployment
risk. In each panel, individuals are ranked by decreasing order of their willingness-to-pay. The group on the left (I)
are individuals who are insured with the supplemental coverage both in 2006 and 2007 and have the highest level of v.
The middle group corresponds to the marginals (M): individuals who were insured with the supplemental coverage
in 2006 but switch out in 2007 when the premium increases. They have a lower level of v than the always insured
(I), but a higher level of v than the last group on the right (U), of individuals who neither buy the supplemental
coverage in 2006, nor in 2007. Using this ranking, we perform direct non-parametric tests for risk-based selection, by
correlating willingness-to-pay with various measures of unemployment risk Y . For each risk outcome, we report the
average risk outcome of each group controlling for the same vector of characteristics X affecting contract differenti-
ation, that we use in the positive correlation tests. Panel A reports the average displacement rate in 2008 for each
group. Panel B reports the average number of days spent unemployed in 2008 for each group. Panel C and D report
for each group the average firm layoff risk and the predicted layoff risk using our risk shifters, as defined in Section
4.2.
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Figure 13: Price Variation: Dynamics.
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Notes: Because risk realization in 2008 may fail to fully capture the unemployment risk faced by an individual as
she is making her coverage choice in 2007, the Figure uses individual risk realizations further into the future, as done
previously in the context of the positive correlation test in Figure 2. This Figure reports the correlation between
willingness-to-pay in 2007 and realized displacement outcomes in 2008, 2009,.. up to 2012. Panel A reports for
each year k ∈ 2008, ...2012, the semi-elasticity (EM [Yk]− EU [Yk])/EU [Yk] of the displacement rate in year k for the
marginals M relative to the uninsured U . Panel B, reports the corresponding semi-elasticity (EI [Yk]−EU [Yk])/EU [Yk]
for the insured I. Note that the average outcome of each year k and each group G, EG[Yk] is conditional on X, the
baseline vector of controls for contract differentiation used in the positive correlation tests. To be precise, we compute
the average outcome, fixing the average characteristics X in each group at the same level as that of the uninsured U.
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Figure 14: Price Variation: Unpriced Observables by willingness-to-pay v
A. Age B. Years of Education
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Notes: The Figure uses the 2007 price reform to rank individuals according to their willingness-to-pay for the
supplemental coverage v, and then uses this ranking to correlate willingness-to-pay with various observable char-
acteristics correlated with unemployment risk. In each panel, individuals are ranked by decreasing order of their
willingness-to-pay. The group on the left (I) are individuals who are insured with the supplemental coverage both
in 2006 and 2007 and have the highest level of v. The middle group corresponds to the marginals (M): individuals
who were insured with the supplemental coverage in 2006 but switch out in 2007 when the premium increases. They
have a lower level of v than the always insured (I), but a higher level of v than the last group on the right (U),
of individuals who neither buy the supplemental coverage in 2006, nor in 2007. Using this ranking, we investigate
to what extent risk-based selection is driven by selection along unpriced observable characteristics correlated with
unemployment risk. For each characteristic, we report the average outcome of each group controlling for the same
vector of characteristics X affecting contract differentiation, that we use in the positive correlation tests. Panel A
reports the average age for each group. Panel B reports the years of completed education for each group. Panel C
reports the average industry level displacement probability for each group. Panel D reports the total number of days
spent unemployed between 2002 and 2006 for each group.
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Figure 15: Price Variation: Selection on preferences
A. Net Wealth in 2006 (thousands of SEK)
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Notes: The Figure uses the 2007 price reform to rank individuals according to their willingness-to-pay for the
supplemental coverage v, and uses this ranking to correlate v with proxies for the value of unemployment insurance
and risk preferences. In both panels, individuals are ranked by decreasing order of v. The group on the left (I) are
individuals who are insured with the supplemental coverage both in 2006 and 2007 and have the highest level of v.
The middle group corresponds to the marginals (M): individuals who were insured with the supplemental coverage
in 2006 but switch out in 2007 when the premium increases. They have a lower level of v than the always insured
(I), but a higher level of v than the last group on the right (U), of individuals who neither buy the supplemental
coverage in 2006, nor in 2007. Using this ranking, we correlate in panel A willingness-to-pay with the level of net
wealth in 2006. Individuals with higher net wealth have better means to smooth consumption in case of displacement
and should have a lower valuation of additional unemployment insurance. We winsorize net wealth and eliminate the
bottom and top percentile of the distribution. In panel B, we proxy for risk aversion using the fraction of total net
wealth invested in risky assets (stocks). In both panels we report the average outcome of each group controlling for
our baseline vector of characteristics X plus a cubic polynomial for age, and a cubic for net wealth in panel B.
Figure 16: Welfare Analysis
A. Value vs. Cost of Supplemental Coverage
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Notes: The figure shows the value and cost curves underlying the welfare implementation in Section 6. Panel A
compares the value v and cost c of providing supplemental coverage for different workers ranked based on their
valuation v.Both coincide for a premium of 1, 477SEK, at which 84 percent of workers would buy insurance. The
value is below cost for workers with lower valuation, making it inefficient to mandate them to buy the supplemental
coverage. The linear value (or demand) curve is derived based on the share of individuals switching out of the
comprehensive plan in response to the premium increase in 2007. The supplemental cost curve is the difference
between the cost of providing the comprehensive plan and the basic plan, plotted separately in Panel B. For the
comprehensive plan cost curve, we start from the observed EI(c1) (marked by ‘x’) and extrapolate to EM (c1) and
EU (c1) (marked by ‘o’). For the basic plan cost curve, we start from the observed EU (c0) (again marked by ‘x’) and
extrapolate to EM (c0) and EI(c0) (again marked by ‘o’). The extrapolation uses our estimates from the price variation
strategy in Section 5.2 and relies on the equality in (12), as further explained in Appendix B. For the uninsured,
we can alternatively calculate EU (c1|0), the counterfactual cost of providing comprehensive coverage, assuming they
continue to put in the effort they exert under basic coverage. The difference EU (c1|0− c0) provides a lower bound on
the cost of providing supplemental coverage EU (c), indicated by the dashed horizontal line in Panel A.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean P10 P50 P90
I. Unemployment
Displacement probability 3.56% - - -
Displacement probability (exc. quits) 3.35% - - -
Unemployment probability 4.71% - - -
Unemployment spell (days) 3.37 0 0 0
Duration of spell (days) 155.99 21 92 328
Fraction receiving layoff notification .05 - - -
Fraction switching firms .04 - - -
II. Union and
UI Fund Membership
Union membership .75 - - -
UI fund membership (V ) .86 - - -
III. Demographics
Age 42.02 28 42 56
Years of education 12.9 11 12 16
Fraction men .51 - - -
Fraction married .47 - - -
IV. Income and Wealth
SEK 2003(K)
Gross earnings 236.7 54.5 228 387.9
Net wealth 490 -178.7 99.7 1148
Bank holdings 50.2 0 0 123
Notes: The Table provides summary statistics for our main sample of interest over the period 2002 to 2006, which
comprises the universe of workers in Sweden aged between 25 and 55. Data on unemployment outcomes comes
from the Public Employment Service register combined with the IAF register. Unemployment is defined as a spell
of non-employment, following an involuntary job loss, and during which an individual has zero earnings, receives
unemployment benefits and reports searching for a full time job. We define displacement as an involuntary job loss,
due to a layoff or a quit following a ‘valid reason’. Voluntary quits are not included in our measures of displacement
and unemployment. See text for details. The probability of displacement is the probability to be displaced in year
t+1 conditional on working in year t. The unemployment probability is the probability to be unemployed in year t+1
unconditional on employment status in year t. The fraction of workers receiving layoff notification comes from the
layoff-notification register (VARSEL) and is defined as the fraction of workers that are employed in an establishment
emitting a layoff notification in year t. The employer-employee matched data (RAMS) registers all existing labor
contracts on a monthly basis. We define a “firm switch” as moving from having a labor contract with firm j (the origin
firm) to having a contract with firm k (the destination firm), without any recorded non-employment spell between
these two contracts. UI fund membership information comes from tax data for the period 2002 to 2006, during which
premia were eligible for a 40% tax credit. The dummy variable V for buying the comprehensive coverage in year t is
defined as reporting any positive amount of premia paid in year t. All earnings, income and asset level measures are
from wealth and income registers, and are yearly measures in constant k2003SEK. All assets are aggregated at the
household level and estimated at their market value. 1SEK2003 ≈ 0.11 USD2003
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Table 2: Positive Correlation Tests: Bivariate Probits
Test ρ = 0
ρ s.d. χ2 P-Value
Proba. of displacement .3047 .0030 8842.4 0.00
Proba. of displacement excl. quits .3056 .0031 8493.9 0.00
Notes: The Table reports positive correlation estimates between insurance and risk using bivariate probit models.
We specify both the choice of insurance coverage and the probability of displacement as probit models allowing for
correlation ρ between the two error terms  and η. The Table reports estimates of ρ and its standard error. We also
report results of formal tests of the null that ρ = 0. In the first row, we consider the probability of displacement. In
the second row we consider the probability of displacement excluding quits, as some quits may be eligible for UI
after a waiting period. See text for details.
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Table 3: Positive Correlation Tests: Non-Parametric Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables included in partitioning the data in cells
Baseline + Demo- + Educ & + Past U Predicted
graphics Industry History Layoff Risk
# of cells 40 484 1,124 1,923 50
Average cell size 50,903 3,181 958 415 17,193
Median cell size 35,275 1,270 346 141 17,193
Minimum cell size 14,202 88 6 5 17,193
Fraction of cells too
granular
0% 24% 65% 80% 0%
Fraction of rejected
cells
98% 74% 53% 28% 88%
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov stat.
5.98 15.37 16.20 10.47 6.11
Binomial p-value 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Notes: The Table reports results from non-parametric tests of correlation between insurance choices in t and prob-
ability of displacement in t + 1. The procedure of the test consists in partitioning the data into cells where all
observations in a given cell have the same value for the variables in X. Columns (1) to (4) differ in the control
variables included in X and used to partition the data. The procedure then computes within each cell a Pearson’s
χ2 test statistic for independence between UIt and Yt+1. This test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ
2(1)
under the null hypothesis that UIt and Yt+1 are statistically independent (within the cell). The critical values of this
statistic for 95% and 99% confidence are 1.36 and 1.63 respectively. The reported Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic
is scaled by
√
n where n is the number of cells. When adding a lot of controls to the vector X, some cells can become
too granular to compute the test statistic (division by zero). We therefore also report in the Table the number of
cells that are too granular.
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Appendix A Additional Graphs And Tables
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Figure A.1: Positive Correlation Tests - Distribution of χ2 test statistics from all
cells vs Theoretical χ2(1) distribution - Additional Controls
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Notes: The Figure displays the empirical distribution of the Pearson’s χ2 test statistics for independence between
V (buying the comprehensive coverage) and Y , the probability of layoff in t + 1, computed from all the cells where
we split individuals in cells corresponding to various unpriced observable characteristics. In panel A, we only use
priced characteristics (baseline controls of the positive correlation tests), corresponding to the test implemented
in column (1) of Table 3. In panel B, we add controls for demographics (cf. column (2) of Table 3). Panel C
and D add education and past unemployment history controls (cf. column (3) and (4) of Table 3), while panel E
uses our predicted layoff risk measure based on all observable and risk shifers (cf. column (5) of Table 3). The χ2
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a χ2(1) under the null hypothesis that V and Yt+1 are statistically
independent (within the cell). We therefore compare this distribution with a theoretical χ2(1) distribution. Taking
the largest absolute difference between the theoretical and the empirical distribution gives the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test statistic reported in Table 3.
Figure A.2: Switchers Design: Relative Tenure Ranking as a function of event time
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Notes: The Figure focuses on “firm switchers”, i.e. individuals moving from having a labor contract with firm j to
having a contract with firm k, without any recorded non-employment spell between these two contracts. We focus
on individuals with more than 1 year of tenure in the origin firm. In this Figure we show that switchers experience
a variation in their layoff risk coming from underlying variation in their relative tenure ranking. Relative tenure
ranking affects displacement probability due to the strict enforcement of the Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) principle in
Swedish labor laws. To follow the rules pertaining to the application of LIFO, relative tenure ranking is defined
within each establishment times occupation group using the RAMS employer-employee data since 1985. The chart
displays estimates of the event study specification (9) using relative tenure ranking as an outcome. The graph shows
that relative tenure ranking drops abruptly at the time of the firm switch. Panel A of Figure 6 shows that this drop
in tenure ranking translates in a significant increase in displacement risk.
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Figure A.3: The 2007 Price Reform: Flows of individuals switching in and switching
out of the comprehensive coverage over time
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Notes: The Figure reports the evolution of the absolute flows of individuals “switching in” and “switching out”
of the comprehensive coverage over time. The sample is restricted to individuals were meeting the work eligibility
requirement. Individuals who switch in are individuals who were not buying the comprehensive coverage in year t−1
but are buying in year t (blue curve). Individuals who switch out are individuals who were buying the comprehensive
coverage in year t− 1 but are no longer buying in year t (red curve). The Figure shows a large and sudden increase
in the flow of individuals switching out and a decrease in the flow of individuals switching in, following the large
increase in the the premia paid for the supplemental coverage in 2007.
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Appendix B Details of Welfare Implementation
This appendix provides further detail on the welfare implementations presented in Section 6.
Cost Curves The cost of providing plan k to a worker of type θ and exerting effort ak(θ)
equals ck = pi(θ, ak(θ)) · bk. Our baseline implementation assumes ck = pi(θ) · ak · bk with the
exerted effort ak being independent of the agent’s type θ. We also assume that the agent’s risk
pi(θ) = pi (X) + , with pi (X) the predicted risk from all observables in our model and  a random
term with mean zero, orthogonal to v. Under these two assumptions, we have that for any two
groups A,B ∈ {I,M,U} and any plan k
EA (ck)
EB (ck)
=
EA
(
pi (X)
)
EB
(
pi (X)
) . (12)
That is, for both the comprehensive plan and the basic plan, the ratio of the costs for any two
groups is equal to the ratio of their predicted risks, estimated using the price variation and shown
in panel D of Figure 12.
This allows us to construct the cost curves in panel B of Figure 16. For the comprehensive
plan cost curve, we start from the observed EI(c1) (marked by ‘x’) and we extrapolate to EM (c1)
and EU (c1) (marked by ‘o’), using the equality in (12). For the basic plan cost curve, we start
from the observed EU (c0) (again marked by ‘x’) and we extrapolate to EM (c0) and EI(c0) (again
marked by ‘o’), using again equation (12). For the starting points of these extrapolations, we use
the average annual cost of providing the respective insurance plans between 2002 and 2006, but
scaled down by .20 to account for the taxes paid on the unemployment benefits received.46 We
locate the observed and imputed average costs for the three groups at the midpoint of the ranges
of the corresponding valuation quantiles and then use a piece-wise linear interpolation to construct
the cost curves. Note that the resulting cost curves are, in fact, very close to being fully linear.
Finally, the difference between the cost curves captures the cost of providing the supplemental
coverage, which is compared to the insurance value in the welfare analysis discussed in Section 6.
This cost curve is shown in Panel A of Figure 16.
Moral Hazard Our implementation provides an estimate of the moral hazard response to
supplemental coverage. For the uninsured, we can calculate EU (c1|0) = EU (pi(θ) ·a0 · b1), capturing
the cost of providing comprehensive coverage, assuming they continue to put in the effort they
exert under basic coverage. This cost estimate is indicated in Panel B of Figure 16 by an upward-
facing bracket as it provides a natural bound for the cost of providing comprehensive coverage
as it relies on no unemployment response to the change in coverage. The difference with the
46Here we follow the assumption in Kolsrud et al. [2017]. Note that the marginal tax rate faced by the workers in
our sample in a year that they are observed to be unemployed is on average 22.5%. The average tax rate they pay
on their earnings equals 20.7%.
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imputed cost of providing comprehensive coverage to the uninsured EU (c1) = EU (pi(θ) · a1 · b1)
provides an estimate of the moral hazard response. (Similarly, for the insured, we can calculate
EI(c0|1) = EI(pi(θ)·a1·b0), indicated by the downward-facing bracket in Figure 16, and compare this
to EI(c0) = EI(pi(θ)·a0 ·b0).) Expressed as an elasticity, we find an estimate of εpi,b = .59, which falls
well in the range of recent estimates in the literature [see Schmieder and Von Wachter [2016]]. These
cost estimates also allow for a decomposition of the difference in average cost between providing
comprehensive and basic coverage (see equation (10)). Interestingly, our imputation suggests that
the cost difference of providing the comprehensive coverage to those who select into comprehensive
coverage vs. those who select into basic coverage (i.e., EI(c1) − EU (c1)) is about twice as high
as the difference between providing comprehensive coverage to those who behave accordingly vs.
those who behave as if they have basic coverage (i.e., EU (c1 − c1|0)).
As stated above, our simple implementation relies on two strong assumptions. First, we require
that the risk-based selection is proportional to the selection based on the predicted risk based on
observables. We use the predicted risk based on observables rather than the realized risks to avoid
attributing the moral hazard response by the workers on comprehensive coverage to risk-based
selection. Moreover, our prediction model is not only using our risk shifters, but a comprehensive
set of controls, as we do not want to exclude the correlation between risk and value due to other
factors affecting both. Second, while we allow for moral hazard to affect the cost differential c, our
implementation assumes that the moral hazard response is orthogonal to the insurance valuation,
which excludes so-called selection on moral hazard (see Einav et al. [2013]). We briefly consider
how the imputed cost curves would change when relaxing this second assumption.
Selection on moral hazard would imply that workers select into comprehensive coverage antici-
pating that they will exert less effort to avoid unemployment. Hence, our implementation underes-
timates the slope of the cost curve for comprehensive coverage and thus overestimates EU (c1). To
assess the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we rotate this cost curve downward (keeping
EI (c1) fixed at its observed value) until the implied EU (c1) reaches its lower bound EU
(
c1|0
)
,
which relies on no unemployment response to changes in coverage for the uninsured. As a result,
the implied cost curve for the supplemental coverage would be flattened and lower throughout the
distribution of workers. Still, the cost continues to exceed the value for the group of uninsured and
for the marginal buyers at the pre-reform premium in particular.
Note that it is as plausible that workers select into basic coverage anticipating that they will
exert more search efforts. In this case, our implementation would underestimate the slope of the
cost curve for basic coverage and thus underestimate EI (c0). Again, we can assess the sensitivity
of our results by rotating this cost curve upward (keeping EU (c0) fixed at its observed value) until
the implied EI (c1) reaches its upper bound EI
(
c0|1
)
, implying that the insured’s unemployment
does not respond to changes in coverage. As a result, the implied cost of providing supplemental
coverage is now steeper, but still lower throughout. Again, the cost continues to exceed the value
for the group of uninsured. The implied value for the marginal buyers at the pre-reform premium is
now just marginally below the costs, which almost fully eliminates the fiscal externality of adverse
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selection at the margin.
Appendix C Proofs and Extensions of Welfare Analysis
This appendix provides the proofs of the Propositions in Section 6 and briefly discusses further
extensions.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We consider the welfare impact of the joint price changes dp1 = − (1− F ) dS and dp0 = FdS
and, hence, d (p1 − p0) = −dS The share of individuals buying comprehensive insurance is given
by F =
∫
v≥p dG (v). Applying Leibniz rule, we have
∂F
∂p =
∂F
∂p1
= − ∂F∂p0 = −
∂G(p)
∂p . We can re-write
the change in cost from providing coverage due to the switchers by
∂
∂p
[∫
v≥p
E (c1|v) dG (v) +
∫
v<p
E (c0|v) dG (v)
]
= E (c1 − c0|v = p) ∂G (p)
∂p
= EM (c)
∂F
∂p
.
Invoking the envelope condition for the individuals at the margin (i.e., v − p = 0), we can rewrite
the welfare impact of the subsidy as
dW = {F (1− F )EI (g1)− F (1− F )EU (g0)
−λ [(p1 − p0)− EM (c1 − c0)]× ∂F
∂ [p1 − p0]} × dS,
where EI (g1) =
1
F
∫
v≥p ω
′ (v1 − p1) dG (v) and EU (g0) = 11−F
∫
v<p ω
′ (v0 − p0) dG (v). Re-arranging
terms, we find
dW
dS
/F (1− F ) = {EI (g1)− EU (g0)− λ× (p1 − p0)− EM (c1 − c0)
p1 − p0
∂F
∂[p1−p0] [p1 − p0]
F × (1− F ) }.
Assuming an interior solution, the subsidy can be optimal only if dW/dS = 0. This leads to the
optimality condition in the Proposition for ε 1−F
F
,p =
∂(1−F )/F
∂[p1−p0]
p1−p0
(1−F )/F .
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We consider the welfare impact of an increase in b0, for given prices and coverage b1. The
impact of a change in b0 on the government’s budget depends both on the change in selection into
both plans and the direct effect from increasing the coverage,
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
[p1 − E (c1|v)] dG (v) +
∫
v<p
[p0 − E (c0|v)] dG (v)
]
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= E
(
[p− c]× ∂v
∂b0
|p
)
g (p)−
∫
v<p
E
(
∂c0
∂b0
|v
)
dG (v)
=
p−E
c× ∂v∂b0
E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
) |p
 ∂F
∂b0
− (1− F ) ∂EUc0
∂b0
≡ [p−EM(b0) (c)] ∂F∂b0 − (1− F ) ∂EUc0∂b0
By analogy to the subsidy change, we decompose the change in cost from providing coverage due to
the change in selection as the demand effect ∂F∂b0 multiplied by the fiscal externality p−EM(b0) (c),
caused by the switching of individuals who respond to the coverage change. This fiscal externality
differs from the fiscal externality of the subsidy as different individuals respond to a change in
coverage depending on their marginal value of basic coverage ∂v∂b0 , explaining the weights put on
the costs of the different marginals with valuation equal to p.47
Invoking now the envelope condition for the individuals at the margin (i.e., v − p = 0), we find
dW = (1− F ) ∂EUω0
∂b0
− λ (1− F ) ∂EUc0
∂b0
+ λ
[
p− EM(b0) (c)
] ∂F
∂b0
,
where
∂EUω0
∂b0
=
1
1− F
∫
v<p
E
(
ω′ (v0 − p0) ∂v
∂b0
|v
)
dG (v)
=
1
1− F
∫
v<p
E
(
ω′ (v0 − p0)piu′ (b0) |v
)
dG (v)
= EU (pi)EU
(
g0 × pi
EU (pi)
× u′ (b0)
)
.
Using ∂v∂b0 = pi∂u
′ (b0) and EU (c0) = EU (pi) b0 in the static unemployment model with unemploy-
ment probability pi, we can re-write
∂EUω0
∂b0
= EU (pi)EU
(
pi
EU (pi)
g0 × u′ (b0)
)
,
∂EUc0
∂b0
= EU (pi) +
∂EU (pi)
∂b0
b0 = EU (pi)
[
1 + εEU (pi),b0
]
.
47Following the arguments in Veiga and Weyl [2016] and Handel et al. [2015], we provide a formal derivation in the
technical appendix showing that
∂
∂b0
∫
v(b0)≥p
E (z|v (b0)) dG (v (b0)) = E
(
z
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
g (p) .
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Hence, the welfare impact becomes
dW
λ (1− F )EU (pi) =
EU
(
pi
EU (pi)
g0 × u′ (b0)
)
− λ
λ
− εEU (pi),b0
−
[
1− EM(b0) (c)
p
]
p
EU (c0)
ε1−F ,b0 .
At an (interior) optimum, we need dW =0 and thus the Proposition follows.
C.3 Baily-Chetty Representation
Our optimal policy characterization considers one-dimensional changes in the policy and compares
the impact on agents’ welfare relative to the impact on the government’s budget. Alternatively,
we can consider a joint change in policy instruments that keeps the budget fixed. In particular,
consider the budgetary impact of a joint change in b0 and p0,
dB =
[
(1− F ) + [p− EM (c)] ∂F
∂p0
]
dp0 +
[
− (1− F ) ∂EUc0
∂b0
+
[
p− EM(b0) (c)
] ∂F
∂b0
]
db0.
A budget-balanced change requires
dp0
db0
= EU (pi)
[
1 + εEU (pi),b0
]− [p− EM(b0) (c)] ∂F∂b0 11− F − [p− E (c)] ∂F∂p0 11− F dp0db0
≡ EU (pi)
[1 + εEU (pi),b0]+ [p− EM (c)] ε1−F,[b0,p0]EU (c0) −
cov
(
c, ∂v∂b0 |p
)
E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
) ε1−F,b0
EU (c0)
 ,
where the ε1−F,[b0,p0] corresponds to the demand elasticity with respect to an actuarially fair increase
in basic coverage (accounting for the changed selection). Intuitively, in an adversely selected market,
the increase in basic coverage is relatively cheap, given the low risk types buying basic coverage,
and thus likely to induce individuals who buy comprehensive coverage to switch to basic coverage.
The welfare impact equals
dW/db0
(1− F ) =
∂EU (ω)
∂b0
− ∂EU (ω)
∂p0
dp0
db0
.
Now to move closer to the original Baily-Chetty formula, we use ω = piu (b− p) + (1− pi)u (w − p)
for an agent’s contribution to (utilitarian) social welfare, and assume homogeneity in either risks
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or in marginal utilities, so we find that at the optimum,
EU (u
′ (b0))− EU (u′ (w − p0))
EU (piu′ (b0) + (1− pi)u′ (w − p0)) / (1− EU (pi)) =
varepsilonEU (pi),b0 + [p− EM (c)]
ε1−F,[b0,p0]
EU (c0)
−
cov
(
c, ∂v∂b0 |p
)
E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
) ε1−F,b0
EU (c0)
,
where the left-hand side is determined by the relative difference in marginal utilities of consumption
when unemployed vs. employed, just like in the original Baily-Chetty formula.
C.4 Comprehensive Coverage and Private Markets
In the main text, we only provided the characterization of the basic coverage level, because of
its immediate relation to a minimum mandate. We can derive a characterization of the socially
optimal level of comprehensive coverage in an analogous manner:
Proposition 3. The comprehensive coverage level b1 is optimal, for given subsidy S and basic
coverage b0, only if
EI (g1 × u′ (b1))− λ
λ
− εEI(pi),b1 = −
[
1− EM(b1) (c)
p
]
× p
EI (c1)
× εF,b1.
Note that here the fiscal externality enters the optimality condition with opposite sign, since
an increase in comprehensive coverage attracts more individuals to this plan. To provide intuition,
it is, however, useful to consider again an actuarially fair increase in b1 (funded by those buying
comprehensive coverage). By analogy, we find
EI (u
′ (b1))− EI (u′ (w − p1))
EI (piu′ (b1) + (1− pi)u′ (w − p1)) / (1− EI (pi)) =
εEI(pi),b1 − [p− EM (c)]
εF,[b1,p1]
EI (c1)
+
cov
(
c, ∂v∂b1 |p
)
E
(
∂v
∂b1
|p
) εF,b1
EI (c1)
.
Here, again, the fiscal externality enters with the opposite sign. However, in an adversely selected
market, an increase in comprehensive coverage will be costly given the high risk of buying it and will
likely discourage individuals at the margin from buying it. This suggests that both for setting the
basic coverage and the comprehensive coverage, an increase in the coverage level in an actuarially
fair way is likely to make the supplemental market more adversely selected.
While the equilibrium characterization for a market with profit-maximizing insurance is beyond
the scope of this paper, we can see how profit-maximizing firms will face a similar trade-off when
deciding how to set coverage and price. Two important differences arise compared to the social
planner’s trade-off. First, private insurers may care only about the utility increase for individuals at
the margin of buying their plan. This would change the left-hand side of the above characterization.
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Second, private insurers are likely to only care about how the changed selection affects their own
profits, not how it affects the selection out of other plans. This would change the right-hand
side of the above characterization. In particular, private insurers deciding how to set b1 when
the government provides mininimum coverage b0, will account for [p1 − EM(b1)c1] rather than
[p − EM(b1)c]. In an adversely selected market with average-cost pricing, this would reduce the
impact of the selection effect. As selection effects tend to put downward pressure on the optimal
coverage levels, private insurers may end up over-insuring as a consequence.
C.5 Sorting Effect
The fiscal externality in both Propositions 1 and 2 depends on how many individuals change in
response to the policy (as captured by the demand elasticity) and the cost characteristics of those
who switch. Here we develop formally the argument why the cost characteristics of the switchers
in response to a change in coverage is different than for a change in price under multi-dimensional
heterogeneity.48 In particular, we show that
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
E (c1|v) dG (v)
]
= E
(
c1
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
g (p) .
An anologue derivation applies for the cost of providing basic coverage.
We use notation v′ ≡ ∂v∂b0 . Using iterated expectations, we can re-write
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
E (c1|v) dG (v)
]
=
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
∫
E
(
c1|v,v′
)
f
(
v′|v) g (v) dv′dv]
=
∫
∂
∂b0
[∫
vε≥p−v′[b0−bε]
E
(
c1|vε,v′
)
gε
(
vε|v′
)
dvε
]
f
(
v′
)
dv′
The second equality follows from using f (v′|v) g (v) = g (v|v′) f (v′), approximating v (b0)∼= v (bε)+
v′ × [b0 − bε], and substituting the variable in the integral v (b0)(≡ v) by v (bε)(≡ vε), where
dv = dvε, conditional on v
′. We can now apply Leibniz rule and find after re-substituting,
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
E (c1|v) dG (v)
]
=
∫ [
E
(
c1v
′|p,v′) f (v′|p) dv′] g (p)
= E
(
c1
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
g (p) .
= E (c1|p)E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
g (p) + cov
(
c1,
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
Note also that the effect on the share of individuals buying comprehensive coverage equals
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
dG (v)
]
= E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
)
g (p) ≡ ∂F
∂b0
.
48The derivation follows Handel et al. [2015], which is a slight variation of the approach in Veiga and Weyl [2016].
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Hence,
∂
∂b0
[∫
v≥p
E (c1|v) dG (v)
]
= E
c1 ∂v∂b0
E
(
∂v
∂b0
|p
) |p
 ∂F
∂b0
as used in the proof of Proposition 2.
69
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1502 Swati Dhingra 
John Morrow 
Efficiency in Large Markets with Firm 
Heterogeneity 
1501 Richard Murphy 
Judith Scott-Clayton 
Gill Wyness 
The End of Free College in England: 
Implications for Quality, Enrolments and 
Equity 
1500 Nicholas Bloom 
Renata Lemos 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
Healthy Business? Managerial Education and 
Management in Healthcare 
1499 Thomas Sampson Brexit: The Economics of International 
Disintegration 
1498 Saul Estrin 
Daniel Gozman 
Susanna Khavul 
Equity Crowdfunding and Early Stage 
Entrepreneurial Finance: Damaging or 
Disruptive? 
1497 Francesco Caselli 
Alan Manning 
Robot Arithmetic: Can New Technology 
Harm All Workers or the Average Worker? 
1496 Nicholas Bloom 
Charles I Jones 
John Van Reenen 
Michael Webb 
Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? 
1495 Christian Krekel Can Rising Instructional Time Crowd out 
Student Pro-Social Behaviour? Unintended 
Consequences of a German High School 
Reform 
1494 Lorenzo Caliendo 
Luca David Opromolla 
Fernando Parro 
Alessandro Sforza 
Goods and Factor Market Integration: A 
Quantitative Assessment of the EU 
Enlargement 
1493 Andrew E. Clark 
Sarah Flèche 
Warn N. Lekfuangfu 
The Long-Lasting Effects of Family and 
Childhood on Adult Wellbeing: Evidence 
from British Cohort Data 
1492 Daniel Paravisini 
Veronica Rappoport 
Philipp Schnabl 
 
Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence 
from Exporting Firms 
1491 M.A. Clemens 
J. Hunt 
The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: 
Reconciling Conflicting Results 
1490 V. Bhaskar 
Robin Linacre 
Stephen Machin 
 
The Economic Functioning of Online Drug 
Markets 
1489 Abel Brodeur 
Warn N. Lekfuangfu 
Yanos Zylberberg 
 
War, Migration and the Origins of the Thai 
Sex Industry 
1488 Giuseppe Berlingieri 
Patrick Blanchenay 
Chiara Criscuolo 
 
The Great Divergence(s) 
1487 Swati Dhingra 
Gianmarco Ottaviano 
Veronica Rappoport 
Thomas Sampson 
Catherine Thomas 
 
UK Trade and FDI: A Post-Brexit Perspective 
 
1486 Christos Genakos 
Tommaso Valletti 
Frank Verboven 
 
The Compact City in Empirical Research: A 
Quantitative Literature Review 
1485 Andrew E. Clark 
Sarah Flèche 
Richard Layard 
Nattavudh Powdthavee 
George Ward 
 
The Key Determinants of Happiness and 
Misery 
1484 Matthew Skellern The Hospital as a Multi-Product Firm: The 
Effect of Hospital Competition on Value-
Added Indicators of Clinical Quality 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
